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ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS AND METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL MOBILITY 
by 
Benjamin Zweig 
Adviser: Professor Wim Vijverberg 
This dissertation consists of three essays which aim to extend the methodology and 
analysis of the study of social mobility. In the first essay, differences in intergenerational 
mobility across race and across the parent’s earnings distribution are explored through a 
nonparametric framework. Components of mobility are differentiated and analyzed separately in 
order to get a comprehensive account of heterogeneities in mobility. Several important 
differences are found including higher expected mobility for white households, higher 
idiosyncratic mobility for black households, larger disparities in expected mobility at the high 
end of the earnings distribution, and much higher rates of overall intergenerational persistence 
for black households. 
The second essay addresses a source of bias in the comparison of mobility across 
subgroups. An increasingly popular method for estimating differences in intergenerational 
mobility across subgroups is the use of transition matrices. This has encouraged the practice of 
partitioning the sample into several discrete parts in order to draw comparisons. There is a 
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notable bias that arises from the practice of discretization, which can lead to misleading 
conclusions. In this paper, that bias is explored and a new method for its correction is proposed. 
The third essay explores the heterogeneous effect of macroeconomic shocks on 
intragenerational consumption mobility. The dynamics of consumption is of considerable interest 
but has gotten limited exposure in recent research due to a lack of household-level panel data. 
This paper pools the panel datasets that are available through The World Bank Living Standard 
Measurement Surveys in order to get robust measures of the annual mobility of household per-
capita consumption. Through a differentiation of mobility between its downward component, 
vulnerability, and its upward component, adaptability, asymmetries are explored in the 
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1 Heterogeneities in Intergenerational Mobility across Subgroups: 




























Differences in intergenerational mobility across race and across the parent’s earnings distribution 
are explored through a nonparametric framework. Components of mobility are differentiated and 
analyzed separately in order to get a comprehensive account of heterogeneities in mobility. 
Several important differences are found including higher expected mobility for white households, 
higher idiosyncratic mobility for black households, larger disparities in expected mobility at the 
high end of the earnings distribution, and much higher rates of overall intergenerational 











1.1.  Introduction 
 
In December of 2013, President Obama declared that weakness in economic mobility, 
along with inequality, was the “defining challenge of our time.” A recent Pew study called 
attention to the disturbing fact that, for the first time in recorded history, most parents believe 
their children will be worse off than themselves (Pew 2011). This dissatisfaction seems to stem 
from the well-accounted phenomenon that income gains in the past three decades have favored 
the top end of the income distribution (Milonovic 2011). That is not to say, however, that the 
income gains favor individuals who began at the top end of the income distribution. It is entirely 
possible that income inequality could be increasing while income increases favor the poor. If 
there is sufficient mobility in economic outcomes, individuals, especially in the United States, 
are content with high income inequality (Reeves 2014a). It is only when inequality increases 
without mobility that there is, and should be, a problem. 
There is a strong cross-country relationship between inequality and intergenerational 
economic mobility, a phenomenon that then Council of Economic Advisor Chairman Alan 
Krueger dubbed the “Great Gatsby Curve” (2012). The relationship between inequality and 
mobility are linked both through demographic conditions (Mankiw 2013) and through policies 
that favor or disfavor the possibilities of movement through the income distribution (Corak 2013, 
Reeves 2014a).  
The name of the curve is meant to be ironic; The Great Gatsby, the 1925 F. Scott 
Fitzgerald novel, embodies the iconic American Dream of the possibility of becoming rich, even 
when being from a poor family (Fitzgerald 1925). The American Dream has been a hallmark of 
American identity since Horatio Alger popularized the idea in 1868 (Alger 1868, Reeves 2014b). 
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It refers to the idea that economic and social outcomes are not dictated at birth, that individuals 
are free to mold their economic destinies.  
This idea can be summarized by the strength of the relationship between the 
characteristics of individuals and their children’s outcomes later in life. It is only recently that 
there has been a looming identity crisis in the United States over the comprehension of relatively 
low mobility rates (Reeves 2014b), both empirically and popularly. Empirically, this is because 
panel data that track households over time have only recently become available (Solon 1992). 
Popularly, this is because the stark contrast between perceptions and results has caught the 
attention of concerned Americans (Reeves 2014b). 
Resulting from the growing interest and importance of mobility and its implications for 
American culture and equality, several summary statistics of mobility have emerged (Fields & 
Ok 1999). These measures have been used to draw comparisons of mobility across regions 
(Solon 2002, Chetty et al. 2014a), over time (Lee & Solon 2009, Chetty et al. 2014b), and across 
subgroups of a population (Hertz 2002, Buchinsky et al. 2004, Bhattacharya & Mazumder 2011, 
Rothbaum 2012). 
The growth in the measurement of mobility is, surely, a positive means to understanding 
the phenomenon. However, as this paper will show, there are intricacies in measurements of 
mobility that may be hidden by painting the concept in broad strokes. Different measures of 
mobility have subtle characteristic differences that can make differences in conclusions. The 






1.2.  Summary Measures of Mobility 
 
The two most widely used summary measures of intergenerational mobility are the 
intergenerational elasticity (� ) and the intergenerational correlation (� ). The theoretical 
framework for �  was developed by Becker & Tomes (1979) but was only first estimated using 
panel data by Solon (1992) since panel data were not available when Becker & Tomes developed 
their framework. The method for measuring �  is to regress the natural log of child’s earnings 
on the natural log of parent’s earnings, which leads to an elasticity that represents the sensitivity 
of an individual’s earnings to that individual’s parent’s earnings. Let ��  represent the natural 
log of child’s earnings and ��� represent the natural log of parent’s earnings. [ ] �� � =  +  ���� +  �� 
Let ̂  be the OLS estimate of �  and be calculated by ���,������ , where, as a notational 
device, � ,�  measures the sample covariance between ��� and ��  and �  measures the 
sample variance of ���. Since a higher IGE reflects a closer relationship between child’s 
earnings and parent’s earnings, it is a measure of intergenerational persistence. 
The intergenerational correlation can take on two meanings and can be the source of 
some confusion. There are two types of correlation measure – a Pearson correlation coefficient 
(Pearson 1896) and a Spearman correlation coefficient (Spearman 1904). The Pearson 
intergenerational correlation coefficient, � �, represents the unit-neutral strength of the 
relationship between child’s earnings and parent’s earnings. The Spearman intergenerational 
correlation coefficient, � , represents the unit-neutral strength of the relationship between the 
rank of child’s earnings and the rank of parent’s earnings. 
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� � may be viewed as an adjustment of �  that removes any changes in inequality of 
earnings. Take the following calculation for the estimate of � �: [ ] � ,� =  � ,�� � =  ̂ ��  
If inequality over generations were constant, the sample variance of child’s earnings and 
parent’s earnings would be equal and the � � would be equal to the � . If inequality were 
rising over time, �  would be greater than �  leading to an � � that would be smaller than 
the � . As a measure of mobility, � � is preferable to �  since it isolates mobility from 
changes in inequality that can confound any analysis that aims to attribute factors to mobility. In 
general, the more isolated the factor can be, the better its meaning and consequences can be 
understood. � � is the measure that has been frequently referred to simply as the intergenerational 
correlation (King 1983, Fields & Ok 1996, Buchinsky et al. 2004, Fields 2008, Blanden 2013). 
The Spearman correlation coefficient is a rank-based metric that addresses the monotonic 
relationship between two variables without making any assumptions about the frequency 
distributions between the two variables. In order to calculate � �, earnings are converted into 
ranks. These ranks can be scaled into percentiles which makes the analysis more familiar. Let ��� represent the percentile of child’s earnings within the entire earnings distribution of the 
child’s generation. Let � ��� represent the percentile of parent’s earnings within the entire 
earnings distribution of the parent’s generation. [ ] ���� =  +  � ���� +  � 
Let ̂  be the OLS estimate of �  and be calculated by �����,���������� . This measure can be 
referred to as a correlation since all ranks or percentiles, as long as both variables are divided 
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into the same number of intervals, follow an equivalent uniform distribution with the same 
variance. That is, since ��� = ���, it follows that: [ ] ���, ��� =  ���, ������ ��� =  ���, ������ =  ̂  � �, unlike � �, does not require that the relationship between the natural log of 
child’s earnings and the natural log of parent’s earnings be linear since it measures them both on 
an ordinal scale. It does, however, require that the relationship between the percentile of child’s 
earnings and the percentile of parent’s earnings be linear. Both measures of intergenerational 
persistence, using both natural log of earnings and percentiles of earnings, are widely used.  
It has been stressed in Fields (2008) that different indices of mobility measure different 
underlying relationships. Hauke & Kossowski (2011) caution against being flippant about the 
use of Pearson or Spearman correlation coefficients by showing very different coefficients (and 
in some cases even different signs) that come from the same data. Buchinsky et al. (2004) 
measure changes in mobility over time in France using � � (Francs) and � � (Ranks). They 
find that the measures are only loosely correlated with each other over the period from 1967 to 
1999 and sometimes offer different conclusions about whether persistence has been increasing or 
decreasing over certain durations of their sample. 
Since � � and � � both measure what is seemingly the same thing – intergenerational 
persistence – and they may lead to different outcomes, it is critical to be clear about the precise 
question that each measure attempts to shed light on. � �, involving the natural log of earnings, 
answers the question, how dependent is child’s earnings on parent’s earnings? � �, using the 
rank of earnings, answers the question, how dependent is child’s position in the earnings 
distribution on parent’s position in the earnings distribution? The two questions are similar and 
address the same fundamental issue. Although there is much overlap in the two measures, the 
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subtle difference can be important in drawing conclusions. This difference between earnings 
dependence and positional dependence will be relevant when comparing subsets of a population 
using both measures. 
 
1.3. Measures of the Components of Mobility 
 
In light of the importance of analyzing mobility and drawing comparisons across 
subgroups, it is helpful to decompose measures of mobility into its unique elements. It can 
sometimes be unclear what findings, in the data, are mundane artifacts of the construction of 
variables and what reveal meaningful phenomena. It is then helpful, when comparing subgroups, 
to examine what relationships diverge. 
Hertz (2002) introduces two concepts that, together, form the full summary measures of 
mobility: expected mobility and residual mobility. We will refer to Hertz’s residual mobility as 
idiosyncratic mobility to avoid confusion between the concept and the econometric definition of 
residual. To follow through on the illustration of these concepts, we will examine the case of 
measurement using earnings rather than ranks. 
Expected mobility is the conditional expectation function of child’s outcomes on parent’s 
conditions and possible covariates. Without covariates, the model of expected mobility, as shown 
in Equation (1), takes the following function: [ ] ̂[�� |���] = + ��� 
Idiosyncratic mobility is estimated by the skedasticity of the disturbances from Equation 
(1) – it is a measure of variation between child’s outcomes and the expectation of their outcomes. 
Idiosyncratic mobility, then, is: 
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[ ] �̂� =  � �−�̂ − �̂ � � 
In the case of modeling mobility without covariates, expected mobility and idiosyncratic 
mobility are direct complements of each other and provide no new information. This must be 
true since it is known that the sum of squares from the expectation and the disturbance must 
equal the total sum of squares. Idiosyncratic mobility is �̂� =  � �  −  �̂ � or, rather, � �( −
� ,� ). 
In the comparison of subgroups or in the presence of covariates, expected mobility and 
idiosyncratic mobility need not have a direct relationship to each other. Take the case of white 
and black Americans which will be examined in depth in future sections. Let � be a dummy 
variable that represents white households and imagine the following relationship holds: [ ]  �� � =  +  ���� +  �� +  �� 
Imagine now that  is positive. Expected mobility for white households is +  + ���� and the expected mobility for black household would be +  ����. The difference in 
the expected mobility would be  which Hertz (2005) calls the expected mobility gap. 
The �  in this case, , summarizes the sensitivity of child’s earnings to parent’s 
earnings. It is a better measure of the estimate of �  from Equation (1) since race could be a 
confounding variable in the intergenerational transmission. It would be misleading, however, to 
claim  to be a measure of intergenerational persistence. The constant elasticity indicates a 
constant rate of regression to the mean across groups but each group would be regressing to a 
different mean. It, therefore, only provides a measure of within-group persistence and does not 
provide a measure of persistence through the full population. A lack of regression-computed 
values that can compare intergenerational persistence across subgroups has been a major reason 
10 
 
why many researchers have begun to abandon regression-based models in favor of transition 
matrices (Black & Devereux 2011, Bhattacharya & Mazumder 2011). 
The variance of disturbances need not be constant across groups or along the spectrum of 
parent’s earnings. The skedastic function, can be conditioned on race and on parent’s earnings. 
This function of idiosyncratic mobility will be explored in Section 1.6. 
An expected mobility gap or a difference in idiosyncratic mobility would be a legitimate 
reflection of heterogeneity in the process of transmission of earnings from parents to children. 
Together, expected mobility and idiosyncratic mobility can describe the full rate of 
transmission of earnings from the parents to children. With an expectation and a variance around 
that expectation for every observation, it is possible to summarize the full range of possibilities 
of child’s earnings that depend on their parent’s earnings and their race. These can be viewed 
together to give a more complete picture of intergenerational persistence. 
Decomposing the concept of intergenerational mobility or persistence into the concepts 
that determine its outcomes can show how multidimensional persistence actually is. Expected 
mobility and idiosyncratic mobility, when comparing subgroups, can be quite distinct from each 
other. Each one may expose heterogeneities across groups that reveal new insight. The 
importance of the analysis is critical to gaining deeper understanding of the workings of 
intergenerational persistence. 
Reliable summary measures of intergenerational persistence are critical requirements for 
comparisons that can be made across subgroups and across the parent’s earnings distribution. 
Hertz (2008) proposes a method to derive group-specific measures of persistence that are 






The data used in this study is from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) which is 
the most commonly used dataset to measure intergenerational mobility (Black & Devereux 2011). 
The data collection started in 1968, and families have been continuously tracked every year since 
then. After the first generation’s children were old enough to earn their own household incomes, 
it became possible to measure intergenerational mobility. The first intergenerational study done 
on this data was published 24 years after the surveys began (Solon 1992).  
In this study, the sample consists of parent and child pairs of white and black households. 
Only one parent and one child is included in each family. The only observed parents and children 
are those that are the head of their own households between the ages of 40 and 50. No distinction 
is drawn between male-headed households and female-headed households, though the vast 
majority of observations are male-headed households. The sample includes only biologically 
related and cohabitating parent-child pairs. Since intergenerational transmission depends on the 
mechanisms of both nature and nurture, families with only one mechanism would have weaker 
transmissions than families with both. 
The earnings measure for both parents and children is the average of the total annual 
earnings over the age range from 40 to 50 years of age, measured in dollars, beginning in 1968 
and ending in 2011. Deflation to 1968 prices is used to convert all nominal earnings into real 
earnings and thus remove the effect of secular inflation from the analysis. The only observations 
kept are white and black households that had at least one year of earnings over the ten year range. 
With the goal of exploring the intergenerational transmission, earnings are a better 
measure than income and total earnings are a better measure than the per-capita earnings within a 
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household. Income includes government distributions that, while certainly affecting standards of 
living, do not get transmitted to the next generation. Income also includes asset income which, 
though it may be transmitted to some extent, does not fully reflect the true economic nature of 
intergenerational transmission. Dividing earnings by the number of members of a given 
household, to create a measure of per-capita earnings, would also create a better measure of 
standard of living but also not measure what is transmitted from one generation to the next as 
well as total earnings. 
The importance of averaging earnings over a ten year range is that single-year measures 
of earnings are noisy and cause attenuation bias in the estimates of the relationship between 
parent’s earnings and child’s earnings (Solon 1999, Zimmerman 1992). Even if earnings in 
single years were unbiased proxies for lifecycle earnings, the noise inherent in single-year 
measures would result in estimates that would be subject to what Solon (1999, p.1778) refers to 
as “textbook errors in variables inconsistency”. Measurement from additional years can also be 
helpful in absorbing transitory shocks to earnings to better represent lifecycle earnings (Black & 
Devereux 2011). 
The importance of using earnings only later in life is to avoid lifecycle bias. Earnings can 
be used as a proxy for lifetime earnings only if the observed earnings are an unbiased 
representation of lifetime earnings. Lifetime earning potential is often only realized late in 
someone’s career. The variation in earnings in the beginning of careers is smaller than the 
variation of lifetime earnings. Using earnings early in the career will understate the relationship 
between parent’s earnings and child’s earnings because the omitted element of lifecycle earnings 
is positively correlated with parent’s earnings (Reville 1995). Since the children of parents in the 
top of the earnings distribution who are destined for higher long-run earnings would experience 
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higher earnings growth than the children of parents in the top of the earnings distribution who are 
destined for lower long-run earnings growth, the measurement error in the early years is mean-
reverting and would cause a downward bias in the estimation of the intergenerational 
relationship (Solon 1992, Haider & Solon 2006). 
The PSID survey oversamples households with low earnings. Therefore, unless sampling 
weights are applied in the analysis of the PSID data, the results are not nationally representative. 
Because of the oversampling strategy, households at the lower end of the earnings spectrum 
typically have low sampling weights and household at the higher end of the earnings spectrum 
have high sampling weights. As a result, sampling statistics that are computed without sampling 
weights are biased toward the population at the lower end of the earnings distribution. However, 















Table 1.1: Sample Weighted Summary Statistics by Race 
  White Black Total 
Observations 1800.55 556.45 2357 
 Average Years in Sample 4.69 4.40 4.57 
 Average Age in Sample 43.55 43.59 43.56 
Parent’s Earnings    
 Mean $27,739 $11,798 $23,976 
 Standard Deviation $20,375 $14,049 $20,235 
Child’s Earnings    
 Mean $29,589 $14,805 $26,099 
 Standard Deviation $33,481 $11,953 $30,482 
Ln(Parent’s Earnings)    
 Mean 9.95 8.86 9.69 
 Standard Deviation 1.01 1.31 1.18 
Ln(Child’s Earnings)    
 Mean 9.89 9.14 9.71 
 Standard Deviation 1.04 1.27 1.14 
Parent’s Percentile    
 Mean 57.63 25.43 50 
 Standard Deviation 26.90 20.00 28.88 
Child’s Percentile    
 Mean 54.93 34.18 50 
 Standard Deviation 28.18 25.18 28.88 
*Earnings figures are real earnings in 1968 dollars 
 
 
The differences in the summary measures of earnings for white and black households 
shown in Table 1.1 are quite stark. Earnings are significantly lower for black households than for 
white households in both generations. The differences in earnings, however, by all measures, are 
shrinking over time. The distributions of earnings are shown graphically in Figure 1.1 using the 
natural log of earnings and in Figure 1.2 using the percentile of earnings. Let � refer to the 
white distribution in the first generation, � the white distribution in the second generation, � 








Figure 1.2: Probability Distributions of the Percentile of Earnings of White and Black 
Households over Two Generations 
 
 

























Figure 1.1 displays the both the gap in the distributions of earnings between subgroups 
and the narrowing of those distributions over time. Figure 1.2 displays the same phenomenon in 
a different way. It shows the probability of being either white or black conditional on parent’s 
percentile. The flattening of the curves represents a movement of the earnings distribution 
toward independence from race.  
The relationship between child’s earnings and parent’s earnings can be displayed by 
correlation coefficients as are shown in Table 1.2. It should be noted that the reported 
correlations for each race is a measure of within-race persistence and should not be interpreted as 
a comprehensive measure of persistence. 
 








White 0.233 0.226 0.319 
Black 0.195 0.200 0.201 
Total 0.292 0.302 0.395 
 
 
One noteworthy regularity in Table 1.2 is that the overall rates of persistence are greater 
than those of either subgroup. What this tells us is that the mobility within a group is larger than 
the mobility across the distribution. As long as the variance of outcomes within a group is 
smaller than the variance of outcomes of the population, it always means that a given amount of 
mobility is larger relative to group than it is relative a population.  
Another regularity in Table 1.2 is that within-group persistence rates are consistently 
lower for black households than they are for white households. This tells us that black 
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households are more mobile within the black earnings distribution more than white households 
are within the white earnings distribution. 
 
1.5. Expected Mobility and the Expected Mobility Gap 
 
In order to relax any assumptions about the structure of the relationship between child’s 
earnings and parent’s earnings, it is useful to employ nonparametric conditional expectation 
functions rather than linear models. Nonparametric models allow for freedom from having to 
assume specific particular functional relationships that may actually not be consistent with the 
true nature of the relations. This is useful in keeping the analysis entirely descriptive and 
dispassionate. Following the recommendations of Fan (1992) the Epanechnikov kernel is used as 
the smoothing kernel and a constant bandwidth is chosen by Silverman’s rule of thumb method 
which minimizes the conditional weighted integrated mean squared error (Epanechnikov 1969, 
Silverman 1986). 
First using the natural log of earnings as the measure of earnings, two nonparametric 
estimates of conditional expectation functions are considered – one for white households, ̂[�� |���, � = �], the estimate which is shown in Figure 1.3 as �, another for black 
households, ̂[�� |���, � = ], with the estimate shown in Figure 1.3 as �. Estimates of 
these conditional expectation functions are presented with a scatterplot of the natural log of 






Figure 1.3: Child’s Earnings Expectations Conditional on Parent’s Earnings 
  
 
The same analysis is done using the percentile of earnings as the measure of earnings. For 
white households: ̂[ ���|� ���, � = �], denoted in Figure 1.4 as �; for black 
households: ̂[ ���|� ���, � = ], denoted in Figure 1.4 as �. These conditional 
expectation functions are presented in Figure 1.4 together with a scatterplot of the percentile of 



















Figure 1.4: Child’s Earnings Percentile Expectation Conditional on Parent’s Earnings 
 
 
Most striking in Figures 1.3 and 1.4 are the expected mobility gaps. The expectation of 
child’s earnings is consistently higher for white children than black children across the entire 
spectrum of parent’s earnings. The changes in the expected mobility gap in Figure 1.3 are not 
easily visible but appear to be rising along the parent’s earnings distribution.  
To measure the expected mobility gap, the difference in the conditional expectation 
functions between white and black children must be taken at all points along the parent’s 
earnings distribution to create a function of expected mobility gap which is conditional on 
parent’s earnings. Since parent’s earnings is a continuous variable, each child observation has 



















expectation function if that child were white instead of black or black instead of white. Every 
white child has an expectation of earnings conditional on being white and a counterfactual 
expectation of earnings conditional on being black and every black child has an expectation of 
earnings conditional on being black and a counterfactual expectation of earnings conditional on 
being white. The expected mobility gap from Figure 1.3, then, is defined in the following way: [ ] � ��� =  ̂[�� |��� = ����, � = �] −  ̂[�� |��� = ����, � = ] 
Similarly, the expected mobility gap from Figure 1.4 is defined as: [ ] � ���� =   ̂[ ���|� ��� = � ����, � = �] −  ̂[ ���|� ��� = � ����, � = ] 
To visualize how the gap changes along the earnings distribution, the expected mobility 
gaps are plotted along the parent’s percentile of earnings. Even in the measurement of the 
expected mobility gap from the natural log of earnings, it is preferable to display the relationship 
along percentile of parent’s earnings rather than along the natural log of parent’s earnings. The 
order stays the same and the uniform distribution of percentiles ensures that all individuals are 
















Figure 1.6: Expected Mobility Gaps from Figure 1.4 
 
 
The plot of expected mobility gaps in Figures 1.5 and 1.6 reveal significant increases in 

















function shown in Figures 1.3 and 1.4 were linear, the increasing expected mobility gap would 
be evident from the higher within-group �  and �  for white households than for black 
households (shown in Table 1.2). We can interpret this to represent a higher marginal effect of 
parent’s earnings on child outcomes for white families than black families. This does not 
characterize the overall state of intergenerational transmission of earnings in society but can 
provide an important measure nonetheless. But clearly, in the light of the nonlinearities in 
Figures 1.5 and 1.6, knowing the difference in �  and �  does not give as complete a picture 
of the expected mobility gap by parental earnings level as is displayed in Figure 1.5 and 1.6. 
The growth in the expected mobility gap exhibits an important truth about the differences 
in intergenerational mobility across the spectrum of parent’s earnings. The expected mobility gap 
tells us that, in expectation, black children from poor households have worse outcomes than 
white children from similarly poor households and that black children from rich households have 
worse outcomes than white children from similarly rich households. It is a measure of the 
average disadvantage of a black child relative to that child’s white counterpart. What the 
changing expected mobility gap tells us is that rich black children face a more severe 
disadvantage relative to their rich white counterparts than poor black children do relative to their 
poor white counterparts. 
 
1.6. Idiosyncratic Mobility 
 
A central tenet of the philosophy of the American dream is that individuals are not bound 
by the conditions of their household and are, therefore, free to create their own destiny. The 
extent to which an individual’s outcome varies beyond what can be predicted from parental 
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conditions, provides a measure of the power of the individual. All variation in child’s earning 
that cannot be explained by parent’s earnings is attributable to the individual child and can be 
referred to as idiosyncratic. Since the disturbance is defined as the difference between outcome 
and conditional expectation, the magnitude of the disturbance can be interpreted as the 
impotence of conditions on outcomes – the determinant of outcomes that is free from conditions 
and idiosyncratic. 
The conditional expectation function alone does not provide a sense of the chances of a 
child experiencing anything other than the expected outcome or the range of possible outcomes. 
The variation around that function supplements the function such that the full picture of 
possibility emerges. 
Idiosyncratic mobility is a measure of the variation of child’s earnings around the 
expectation.  If idiosyncratic mobility were very small, the earnings of a child would be able to 
be predicted with little error – the expected earnings would coincide closely with actual earnings. 
If idiosyncratic mobility were large, the earnings of a child would encompass a wide range of 
possible outcomes - expected mobility would not necessarily dictate each child’s destiny. 
Disturbances from the conditional expectation function must have an expectation of zero 
at any point across the entire parent’s earnings distribution for both black and white households. 
This follows from the nonparametric construction of the conditional expectation function since 
no functional form was assumed that could have resulted in the non-zero expectation of the 
disturbance at some regions of the parent’s earnings distribution because of model 
misspecification. The conditional variance of the disturbance, the skedastic function, however, 
need not be constant across the parent’s earnings distribution or between groups. 
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Heteroskedasticity across parent’s earnings or between groups would reflect a fundamental 
heterogeneity in intergenerational transmission.  
Comparing skedastic functions is meaningful only if the functions are different because 
of fundamental economic differences in the subgroups. If skedastic functions change along the 
spectrum of parent’s earnings, then observed differences in the variance of the disturbance may 
simply be a statistical artifact. In order to be able to derive economic meaning from the 
differences in the variance of disturbances, it is important that skedastic functions do not 
systematically change along the parent’s earnings distribution. 
The skedastic function does not systematically become skewed at high or low end of the 
earnings distribution. The uniform distribution of the percentile of earnings, on the other hand, 
does lead to systematic skew of the distributions of disturbances across the parent’s earnings 
spectrum. Values are restricted to be between 0 and 100 so that when a conditional expectation is 
different than 50, the distribution of disturbances must be more condensed on one side. For 
example, imagine an upward sloping conditional expectation function that passes through 50 for 
both the dependent and independent variable. When the independent variable is below 50, the 
conditional expectation of the dependent variable will also be below 50. If, say the conditional 
expectation of the dependent variable at a given value of the independent variable is 20, 
disturbances at that point would range from values of -20 to 80 and still have an expectation of 0 
which would indicate a positive skew. At a point where the conditional expectation of the 
independent variable is 80, disturbances would range from values of -80 to 20 and still have an 
expectation of 0 which would indicate a negative skew. To illustrate this point, the residuals 
from the conditional expectation functions  ̂[�� |���, �] and ̂[ ���|� ���, �] are 
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displayed in Figure 1.7 for parents whose earnings are below the median and for parents whose 
earnings are above the median. 
 
Figure 1.7: Distribution of Residuals 
 Lower half of Parent’s Earnings 
Distribution 
Upper half of Parent’s Earnings 
Distribution �� �− ̂[�� |���, �] 




Figure 1.7 shows that only the residuals from natural log estimation are comparable 
across the parent’s earnings distribution. The consistent functional form along the spectrum of 
parent’s earnings indicates that the statistical nature of the variables will not confound estimates 
of residual variance. In order to draw comparisons between races, effects of parent’s incomes on 
the skedastic function must be constant so as not to contaminate any differences between races. 
Since race is highly correlated with parent’s earnings, comparisons between races could also 
display differences that are actually artifacts of the construction of percentiles. It is important 
then, to only compare idiosyncratic mobility from the natural log structure of earnings. 
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Recall that ̂[�� |���, �] is the nonparametric set of functions displayed in Figure 1.3. 
Let the residual, the difference between �� � and ̂[�� |���, �], be portrayed by �. The 
measure of overall idiosyncratic mobility can be expressed using the following function, where 
the expectation of � is taken over ���� and ��: [ ] ̂[ � ] = ̂[ �� � − [�� �|����, ��] ] 
The measure of conditional idiosyncratic mobility over the spectrum of parent’s earnings 
and race can be expressed in the following way: [ ] ̂[ � |� ����, ��] =  ̂[ �� � − [�� �|����, ��] |� ���� ��] 
Idiosyncratic mobility for white households, ̂[ � |� ����, �� = �], is denoted in 
Figure 1.8 as ��� For black households, ̂[ � |� ����, �� = ], is denoted in Figure 1.8 as ���. 
 
















Figure 1.8 shows that black households have a consistently higher rate of idiosyncratic 
mobility than white households across the parent’s earnings distribution. 
The difference, in this case called the idiosyncratic mobility gap, can be estimated using 
the same method used for estimating the expected mobility gap in Equation (8). [ ] �� � =  ̂[ � |����, �� = ] −  ̂[ � |����, �� = �] 
 
Figure 1.9: Idiosyncratic Mobility Gap from Figure 1.8 
 
 
Figures 1.8 and 1.9 show that black households experience higher idiosyncratic mobility 
than white households, although that idiosyncratic mobility gap is not statistically significant and 
has no apparent differences along the spectrum of parent’s earnings. The higher idiosyncratic 
mobility experienced by black households tell us that they are somewhat less bound by their 


















1.7. Persistence Rates 
 
Overall measures of mobility or persistence involve both expectations and variance of 
outcomes. When there is only one population of interest, an overall measure of persistence can 
be captured by the �  – a function of both expected mobility and idiosyncratic mobility. Since 
white households have higher expected mobility and black households have higher idiosyncratic 
mobility, it is necessary to quantify which effect dominates in its contribution to overall 
persistence. 
Within-group measures of persistence are not necessarily meaningful in making 
comparisons of individuals between groups. Consider there are two groups within a population – 
a disadvantaged group that is mobile only across the bottom ten percentiles of the earnings 
distribution in all generations and an advantaged group that is mobile across the entire earnings 
distribution. It is entirely possible in this example that each group has the same rate of within-
group mobility. The within-group intergenerational correlation would fail to represent the 
completely different range of outcomes between a child born into the disadvantaged group and a 
child born into the advantaged group. 
In order to derive a measure that makes it possible to compare persistence rates of 
individuals in different subgroups, it becomes necessary to measure the persistence of a subgroup 
with respect to the full population’s earnings distribution. This can be done by decomposing 
measures of �  to show the contribution to the population �  from each subgroup. A 
decomposition method is provided by Hertz (2008) which is derived below. 
The starting point is the definition of a correlation, with child’s and parent’s earnings as 
the variables of interest.  
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[ ] , =  , =  � ∑ � − ̅ �� − �̅�  
Using � to represent the white subgroup and  represent the black subgroup, Equation 
(13) can be decomposed further. 
[ ] , =  �� + � ∑ �,� − ̅ ��,� − �̅�� + � +  ∑ �, − ̅ ��, − �̅��   
By introducing the constant of group means, each parenthetic term in Equation (14) can 
be expanded. Let �� represent the share of the sample that is white and �� represent the share of 
the sample that is black. [ ]  ,
=  �� � ∑ ( �,� − �̅̅ ̅) − ̅ −  �̅̅ ̅ (��,� − ��̅̅̅̅ ) − �̅ − ��̅̅̅̅��
+ ��  ∑ ( �, − ̅ ) − ̅ −  ̅ (��, − �̅̅̅) − �̅ −  �̅̅̅��
=  �� � ∑ ( �,� − �̅̅ ̅)(��,� − ��̅̅̅̅ ) + ̅ −  �̅̅ ̅ (��,� − ��̅̅̅̅ ) + �̅ −  ��̅̅̅̅ ( �,� − �̅̅ ̅) +  �̅ −  ��̅̅̅̅ ̅ −  �̅̅ ̅��
+ ��  ∑ ( �, − ̅ )(��, − �̅̅̅) + ̅ −  ̅ (��, − �̅̅̅) + �̅ − �̅̅̅ ( �, − ̅ ) +  �̅ −  �̅̅̅ ̅ −  ̅��  
Since the sum of deviations from a mean is zero, several terms drop out. 
[ ] , =  �� � ∑ ( �,� − �̅̅ ̅)(��,� − ��̅̅̅̅ ) +  �̅ −  ��̅̅̅̅ ̅ −  �̅̅ ̅��
+ ��  ∑ ( �, − ̅ )(��, − �̅̅̅) +  �̅ −  �̅̅̅ ̅ −  ̅��  
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Equation (15) can be simplified. Let ,�� ℎ� �  denote the within component of the 
covariance of group  and let ̅, ̅� ��� �  denote the between component of the covariance for 
group . 
[ ] , =  ��  ,�� ℎ� � + ̅, ̅� ��� � +  ��  ,�� ℎ� � + ̅, ̅� ��� �  
  Multiplying both sides of Equation (17) by , we digress from the decomposition of 
correlation to examine the analysis of covariance. [ ] , =  �� ,�� ℎ� � + ̅, ̅� ��� � + �� ,�� ℎ� � + ̅, ̅� ��� �  
Let ,�� ℎ�  be the share-weighted sum of the within covariance of each group. [ ] ,�� ℎ� =  �� ,�� ℎ� � + �� ,�� ℎ� �  
 Let ̅, ̅� ���  be the share-weighted sum of the between covariance of each group.  [ ] ̅, ̅� ��� =  �� ̅, ̅� ��� � + �� ̅, ̅� ��� �  
Equation (18) can, then, be simplified as: [ ] , =  ,�� ℎ� + ̅, ̅� ���  
Equation (21) can provide good intuition into the decomposition between groups. The 
contribution to the total covariance from a group is split into two parts: The within-group 
covariance, ,�� ℎ� , and the between-group covariance, ̅, ̅� ��� , each of which are comprised of 
their share-weighted contributions from each group. 
Let , � �  be the sum of the within covariance and the between covariance for group . 
Equation (18) can also be simplified in the following way: [ ] , =  �� , � � + �� , � �  
Table 1.3 displays the complete analysis of covariance. 
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Table 1.3: Analysis of Covariance 
 White Black Pooled 
Share:  � 0.764 0.236 1 
Within:  ,�  0.237 0.332 0.259 
Between:  ̅,�̅ ���  0.046 0.477 0.147 
Total:  ,  0.282 0.809 0.407 
 
Table 1.3 shows black households having greater magnitudes of covariances than white 
households. This hints at conclusions of persistence but, in order to make unit-neutral 
comparisons between sugbroups, it is necessary to return to the decomposition of correlation. 
Each covariance terms in Equation (17) can be transformed to a correlation if it is divided by the 
product of its corresponding standard deviations. 
[ ] , =  ��  ,�� ℎ� � � �� � + ��  ̅, ̅� ��� � � ��� � � ��� �� ��� � � ��� �
+ ��  ,�� ℎ� � � �� � + ��  ̅, ̅� ��� � � ��� � � ��� �� ��� � � ��� �
=  �� ,�� ℎ� � � � + �� ̅, �̅ ��� � � ��� � � ��� �
+ ��  ,�� ℎ� � � � + ��  ̅, �̅ ��� � � ��� � � ��� �  
The within group standard deviations are straightforward standard deviations with each 
group as the subsample. The between group standard deviations are a more obscure concept 
since there are only two points for each calculation. The between group standard deviation, �, 
is simply the difference in �̅̅ ̅ and ̅. This means that the product of standard deviations for  and 
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� are calculated the same way and are equivalent to the between group covariance and makes 
̅, �̅ ��� �  always equal to 1. The between group correlation coefficient must always be 1 since, 
with only two groups, group means must have a perfect linear relationship to each other. This 
would not be the case with more than two groups. This is true whether group means are being 
compared to population means, as is calculated by the covariance ̅, ̅� ��� � , or to each other, 
as calculated by the covariance ̅, ̅� ��� . We can now further simplify Equation (23): 
[ ] , = �� ,�� ℎ� � � � + �� ̅, ̅� ��� � + �� ,�� ℎ� � � � + �� ̅, ̅� ��� �  
Equation (24) includes terms with  in the denominator which can be thoughts of as 
scaling terms to ensure that all the variation being measured in the within and between measures 
are being put in terms that correspond to variation in the entire distribution. With these terms, 
measures of correlation can become measures of persistence with respect to the entire earnings 
distribution. Let the measure of persistence be called intergenerational persistence or � �. � � 
can be separated into its within and between components and for white and black households. 
Let � ��� ℎ�  be the share-weighted sum of the within persistence of each group. 
[ ] � ��� ℎ�  =   �� ,�� ℎ� � � � + �� ,�� ℎ� � � �   
=   ��� ��� ℎ� � + ��� ��� ℎ� �  
 Let � � � ���  be the share-weighted sum of the between persistence of each group.  
[ ] � � � ���  =  �� ̅, ̅� ��� � + �� ̅, ̅� ��� �                  
=    ��� � � ��� � + ��� � � ��� �  
Equation (24) can, then, be simplified as: 
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[ ] , =  � ��� ℎ� + � � � ���  
Equation (27) provides the same intuition as the analysis of covariance decomposition in 
Equation (22). The � , , , is a complete measure of intergenerational persistence since it is a 
correlation with respect to the entire population and can be thought of as the pooled � �. 
Let � � � �  be the sum of the within � � and the between � � for group . Equation 
(24) can also be simplified in the following way: [ ] , =  ��� � � � + ��� � � �  
These group-specific measures of total intergenerational persistence can be interpreted as 
the intergenerational earnings persistence of the members of a subgroup relative to the entire 
population. They are estimates of the prospective persistence of individuals in a subgroup with 
respect to the overall earnings distribution.  
The ,  measure of overall intergenerational persistence can either be the Pearson 
correlation coefficient, � �, or the Spearman correlation coefficient, � �. Table 1.4 presents a 
full analysis of persistence under both scenarios. 
 













Share:  � 0.764 0.236 1  0.764 0.236 1 
Within:  ����  0.175 0.246 0.192  0.290 0.122 0.250 
Between:  ��� � ���  0.034 0.354 0.109  0.045 0.467 0.144 
Total:  ���  0.209 0.600 0.302  0.335 0.589 0.395 
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Table 1.4 shows a remarkable difference in the total intergenerational persistence 
between black and white households by both measures. The Pearson measure of correlation 
represents black households as experiencing 187% more intergenerational persistence than white 
households. The Spearman measure of correlation represents black households as experiencing 
76% more intergenerational persistence than white households. 
The dissimilarities of Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients have been cautioned 
in Hauke & Kossowski (2011) and displayed in Buchinsky et al. (2004). We must be clear on 
what exactly is being measured when using Pearson correlations and what exactly is being 
measured when using Spearman correlations so that we avoid the temptation to reduce 
persistence to a single measure that will provide different insights based on its measurement. 
In the case of intergenerational correlation, � � measures the strength of the linear 
relationship between the natural log of child’s earnings and the natural log of parent’s earnings. � � measures the strength of the linear relationship between the rank of child’s earnings and the 
rank of parent’s earnings. 
A rank conversion imposes a monotonic transformation on each variable that forces each 
one into a uniform distribution. Rank transformations change the mean observation when 
distributions are skewed since the mean of a rank is the median of the variable. Furthermore, 
they move observations further from the mean when those observations are close in value to 
others and they move observations closer to the mean when those observation are far in value 
from others. 
An observation that is at the mean value of either variable will have no contribution 
regardless of how much it varies from the mean from the other variable. The product of distances 
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from the mean, measured relative to the product of standard deviations, will be the contribution 
of each observation in its contribution to the standard deviation.  
Imposing a rank transformation, then, will shrink the variance of parts of the distribution 
with few observations and expand the variance of parts of the distribution with many 
observations. This will decrease the contribution of observations that have few observations 
around it and increase the contribution of observations that are clustered around other 
observations. 
It is visible in Figure 1.3 that observations are more clustered toward higher earnings than 
lower earnings. A rank transformation, then, increases the contribution of observations with 
child’s and parent’s earnings at the higher end relative to the lower end. There are two lessons to 
be drawn from the results in Table 1.4. Firstly, since � �� is greater than � �� for all groups, we 
can infer that households with higher earnings experience greater persistence than households 
with lower earnings. Secondly, since the increase from � �� to � �� is greater for white 
households than black households, we can infer that white households with higher earnings 
experience much more persistence than white households with lower earnings; whereas black 
households with higher earnings experience slightly less persistence than black households with 
lower earnings. 
In measures of correlation, the magnitude of the contribution from an observation is 
determined by the deviation from the mean of both variables being compared. � �� gives power 
to observations that differ in the natural log of earnings and � �� gives power to observations 
that differ in rank. There are two perspectives of which measure should be preferable: a positive 
one and a normative one.  
36 
 
From a positive economic perspective the measure that would be the best characterization 
of mobility in economic and social condition should be the one that is the best proxy for utility. 
If variation in utility can best be approximated through percent changes in earnings, � �� would 
be preferable to � ��. If variation in utility can best be approximated through changes in rank, � �� would be preferable to � ��. There are arguments made for the appropriate use of both 
measures (Fishburn 1988, Diecidue & Wakker 2001). 
A normative argument, popularized by social philosopher John Rawls (1971), is that 
social policy should be made to benefit the poorest members of society. If the aims of 
understanding mobility prioritize the lower end of the earnings distribution, it should be noted 




Intergenerational mobility, the freedom of an individual from predetermined conditions, 
is a cornerstone of the American Dream and American identity. Understanding mobility is not 
straightforward, as it is a multidimensional concept and there is heterogeneity hiding behind each 
level of decomposition. Using broad summary measures of mobility can hide fundamental 
differences across subgroups and across social strata. 
One component of mobility, expected mobility, represents the expected outcome of a 
child conditional on parent’s earnings. Expected mobility varies significantly across race. The 
difference in expected earnings for white households is greater than for black households at all 
points along the parent’s earnings distribution. This difference, the expected mobility gap, is 
larger at the higher end of the parent’s earnings distribution than it is on the lower end. 
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Another component of mobility, idiosyncratic mobility, is the measure of the variability 
of a child’s outcome from an expectation. Idiosyncratic mobility varies across race as well. The 
difference in the variation of earnings beyond the expectation is greater for black households 
than white households at all points on the parent’s earnings distribution. 
Group-specific measures of intergenerational persistence can be decomposed from full 
measures of intergenerational persistence. This is necessary to examine the persistence of a 
subgroup across the overall earnings distribution, rather than only within the subgroup’s earnings 
distribution. These measures are functions of both the within-group correlation of 
intergenerational earnings and the between-group correlation of intergenerational earnings. They 
reveal large differences in intergenerational persistence across races that differ somewhat 
according to the measure used. A decomposition of the Pearson intergenerational correlation 
coefficient indicates rates of persistence of black households that are nearly triple that of white 
households. A decomposition of the Spearman intergenerational correlation coefficient indicates 
rates of persistence of black households that are almost double that of white households. To echo 
the caution of Buchinsky et al. (2004), Fields (2008), and Hauke & Kossowski (2011), different 
ways of measuring the same variable can yield very different results. Irrespective of the choice of 
measurement, however, it is clear that black households experience a much lower degree of 
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2 The Dangers of Discretization: 



























An increasingly popular method for estimating differences in intergenerational mobility across 
subgroups is the use of transition matrices. This has encouraged the practice of partitioning the 
sample into several discrete parts in order to draw comparisons. There is a notable bias that 
arises from the practice of discretization, which can lead to misleading conclusions. In this paper, 
















There has been a recent surge in the public’s interest in understanding the large increases 
in income inequality in the United States. This growing problem is hotly debated and has 
demanded explanation for what drives inequality in outcomes. In the United States, where there 
is common sympathy for the concept of the American Dream, inequality in itself is not seen as a 
bad thing insofar as there is equality in opportunity. If the chances of reaching the top of the 
earnings distribution are broad-based, the differences within the earnings distribution are less of 
a problem. This has wide intuitive appeal and has led research down the path of exploring 
differences in opportunity. The growing demand for understanding the extent to which 
households are not trapped in their economic status over time has extended well beyond the 
walls of academia and into the public sphere (Obama 2014).  
In the United States, a perceived classless society where all are born equal, there has been 
less policy emphasis on social mobility than the in United Kingdom, popularly depicted as a 
society dominated by rigid social structures (Reeves 2014a). Recent evidence on cross-country 
differences in intergenerational mobility, however, contradicts popular beliefs and shows that the 
United States actually has quite low rates of intergenerational mobility relative to other 
developed countries (Solon 2002, Black & Devereux 2011). This has led to more popular and 
political emphasis on the question of equality of opportunity in the United States (Reeves 
2014b). 
While the belief is widely shared that equality of opportunity is important, it is not 
obvious what the rates of intergenerational transition of a population should be. By comparing 
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subgroups, the focus shifts from equality of opportunity for an entire population to the 
egalitarianism of opportunity between groups which is a topic that is less fraught with ambiguity. 
The traditional way of measuring intergenerational mobility has been to regress the 
natural log of children’s earnings on the natural log of parent’s earnings which leads to the 
intergenerational elasticity (IGE) or to regress the percentile of children’s earnings on the 
percentile of parent’s earnings which leads to the intergenerational correlation (IGC) (Solon 
1999, Black & Devereux 2011). These regression-based methods are ill-suited to comparing 
subgroups since the IGE and IGC are interpretations of the rate of regression to the group means 
rather than to the population means (Bhattacharya & Mazumder 2011). 
In order to be able to compare subgroup movement within the entire sample rather than 
the group sample, researchers have begun to use transition matrices (Hertz 2005). A transmission 
matrix is usually a four-by-four or five-by-five matrix that separates parent’s earnings and 
children’s into equally sized groups (quantiles). The extent to which opportunities are different 
across groups can be examined fully through the differences in the transition matrices. The 
appeal of comparing expected earnings quantiles of the child, conditional on the earnings 
quantile of the parent, is that we are comparing only the households whose parents come from 
the same earnings quantile of the population. This is taken to represent the counterfactual of what 
the expected quantile of the child would have been had the subgroup been different for a given 
household. 
While standard regression methods can be informative of the conditional expectation of 
an outcome for an individual, it does not reveal the probability of observing outcomes other than 
the expected one. Transition matrices are more useful in capturing the full range of probabilities 
of movement from some area of the distribution to another. 
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As will be shown in Section 2.3, the most informative summary measures that these 
transition matrices contain are differences between the subgroups in the children’s expected 
quantile within each quantile of the parent – the differences in expected outcome of the child are 
taken for each quantile. To take this summary measure further, we can take the expectation of 
each of those to represent the expected difference in prospective outcomes. 
Transition matrices are now widespread in many areas of social research including the 
academic disciplines of Economics (Black & Devereux 2011) and Sociology (Torche 2014), 
think-tank organizations (Hertz 2006, Isaacs et al 2008, Mazumder 2008, Urahn et al 2012, 
Reeves 2013), and politics (Obama 2013). Figure 2.1, below, is an example of a comparison of 

















Figure 2.1: Transition Matrices used in Pew Charitable Trusts Report 
 
Source: “Pursuing the American Dream: Economic Mobility across Generations,” Page 20 
Pew Charitable Trusts, Urahn et al., July 2012 
 
The recent expansion of the use of transition matrices is troublesome, however, because 
comparisons between them may be biased. The source of the bias lies in the within-quantile 
variation of the parents and its difference between the subgroups. In this example, earnings are 
typically lower among black Americans than they are for white Americans. This disparity in 
earnings is not completely adjusted for by the use of quantiles since it will still hold true within a 
given quantile. For example, if parent’s earnings are lower for black Americans than for white 
Americans by an average of 30 centiles, then, in a five-by-five transition matrix it is reasonable 
to expect the parent’s percentile within the 3rd quintile to be closer to the 2nd if the parent is black 
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and closer to the 4
th
 if the parent is white. The within-quantile difference could explain a portion 
of why within a given quantile black children seem to move to lower quantiles than white 
children. Failing to control for within-quantile percentile will bias the estimate of the difference 
between subgroups in favor of the group with higher parent’s earnings. 
 This paper explores and reveals biases in discretizing the sample of households into 
quantiles. Differences in prospective outcomes across subgroups are measured with transition 
matrices in which there is shown to be substantial bias when households are discretized. The 
benefit of the simplicity of discretization is acknowledged and adjustments are recommended to 





The data used in this study is from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) which is 
the most commonly used dataset to measure intergenerational mobility (Black & Devereux 
2011). The data collection started in 1968, and families have been continuously tracked every 
year since then. After the first generation’s children were old enough to earn their own household 
incomes, it became possible to measure intergenerational mobility. The first intergenerational 
study done on this data was published 24 years after the surveys began (Solon 1992).  
In this study, the sample consists of parent and child pairs of white and black households. 
Only one parent and one child is included in each family. The only observed parents and children 
are those that are the head of their own households between the ages of 40 and 50. No distinction 
is drawn between male-headed households and female-headed households, though the vast 
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majority of observations are male-headed households. The sample includes only biologically 
related and cohabitating parent-child pairs. Since intergenerational transmission depends on the 
mechanisms of both nature and nurture, families with only one mechanism would have weaker 
transmissions than families with both. 
The earnings measure for both parents and children is the average of the total annual 
earnings over the age range from 40 to 50 years of age, measured in dollars, beginning in 1968 
and ending in 2011. Deflation to 1968 prices is used to convert all nominal earnings into real 
earnings and thus remove the effect of secular inflation from the analysis. The only observations 
kept are white and black households that had at least one year of earnings over the ten year 
range. 
With the goal of exploring the intergenerational transmission, earnings are a better 
measure than income and total earnings are a better measure than the per-capita earnings within a 
household. Income includes government distributions that, while certainly affecting standards of 
living, do not get transmitted to the next generation. Income also includes asset income which, 
though it may be transmitted to some extent, does not fully reflect the true economic nature of 
intergenerational transmission. Dividing earnings by the number of members of a given 
household, to create a measure of per-capita earnings, would also create a better measure of 
standard of living but also not measure what is transmitted from one generation to the next as 
well as total earnings. 
The importance of averaging earnings over a ten year range is that single-year measures 
of earnings are noisy and cause attenuation bias in the estimates of the relationship between 
parent’s earnings and child’s earnings (Solon 1999, Zimmerman 1992). Even if earnings in 
single years were unbiased proxies for lifecycle earnings, the noise inherent in single-year 
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measures would result in estimates that would be subject to what Solon (1999, p.1778) refers to 
as “textbook errors in variables inconsistency”. Measurement from additional years can also be 
helpful in absorbing transitory shocks to earnings to better represent lifecycle earnings (Black & 
Devereux 2011). 
The importance of using earnings only later in life is to avoid lifecycle bias. Earnings can 
be used as a proxy for lifetime earnings only if the observed earnings are an unbiased 
representation of lifetime earnings. Lifetime earning potential is often only realized late in 
someone’s career. The variation in earnings in the beginning of careers is smaller than the 
variation of lifetime earnings. Using earnings early in the career will underestimate the 
relationship between parent’s earnings and child’s earnings because the omitted element of 
lifecycle earnings is positively correlated with parent’s earnings (Reville 1995). Since the 
children of parents in the top of the earnings distribution who are destined for higher long-run 
earnings would experience higher earnings growth than the children of parents in the top of the 
earnings distribution who are destined for lower long-run earnings growth, the measurement 
error in the early years is mean-reverting and would cause a downward bias in the estimation of 
the intergenerational relationship (Solon 1992, Haider & Solon 2006). 
The PSID survey oversamples households with low earnings. Therefore, unless sampling 
weights are applied in the analysis of the PSID data, the results are not nationally representative. 
Because of the oversampling strategy, households at the lower end of the earnings spectrum 
typically have low sampling weights and household at the higher end of the earnings spectrum 
have high sampling weights. As a result, sampling statistics that are computed without sampling 
weights are biased toward the population at the lower end of the earnings distribution. With the 
application of sampling weights, the estimates reflect the entire population. 
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There are sizeable differences in the earnings of white and black households, both in the 
parent’s generation and the child’s generation. These differences are displayed numerically in 
Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Sample Weighted Summary Statistics by Race 
  White Black Total 
Observations 1800.55 556.45 2357 
 Average Years in Sample 4.69 4.40 4.57 
 Average Age in Sample 43.55 43.59 43.56 
Parent’s Earnings    
 Mean $27,739 $11,798 $23,976 
 Median $25,107 $9,671 $20,980 
 Standard Deviation $20,375 $14,049 $20,235 
Child’s Earnings    
 Mean $29,589 $14,805 $26,099 
 Median $22,103 $12,702 $19,406 
 Standard Deviation $33,481 $11,953 $30,482 
Ln(Parent’s Earnings)    
 Mean 9.95 8.86 9.69 
 Standard Deviation 1.01 1.31 1.18 
Ln(Child’s Earnings)    
 Mean 9.89 9.14 9.71 
 Standard Deviation 1.04 1.27 1.14 
Parent’s Percentile    
 Mean 57.63 25.43 50 
 Standard Deviation 26.90 20.00 28.88 
Child’s Percentile    
 Mean 54.93 34.18 50 
 Standard Deviation 28.18 25.18 28.88 
*Earnings figures are real earnings in 1968 dollars 
 
Most notable in Table 2.1 is the large difference in mean and median earnings between 




Figure 2.2: The Relative Frequency of Households across Earnings Spectrum by Race 
White Households Black Households 
  
 
In Figure 2.2, the upward slope for white households shows that the concentration of 
white households grows as earnings rise and downward slope for black households shows that 
the concentration of black households shrinks as earnings rise. The difference in concentrations 
of race at both tails of the distribution are quite stark. In both figures, the steeper line is that of 
the parent’s while the more gradual slope is that of the child’s earnings. This can be a reason for 
cautious optimism as it shows a slow but noticeable trend toward parity of race across the 
earnings distribution.  
An obvious point should be made that there should not be any reason for discontinuity in 
the concentration of race anywhere along the earnings spectrum. This is important to note since, 
as will be shown in Section 2.3, it follows that discretization of the earnings distribution 
necessitates an arbitrary omission of detail. 
To visualize the extent of mobility over the generation, scatterplots show the percentile of 
every child’s earnings on the y-axis and the percentile of that child’s parent’s earnings on the x-
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Figure 2.3: Scatterplots of Intergenerational Mobility by Race 
White Households Black Households 
  
 
The most evident observation in Figure 2.3 is the concentration of white household 
around the upper earnings percentiles and the concentration of black households around the 
lower earnings percentiles. There does appear to be a high degree of diffusion across the parental 
earnings distribution. A scatterplot of a perfectly immobile society would show points only on 
the 45-degree line. The deviations from the 45-degree line are a measure of how much mobility 
there is in a society. A rank-based regression study uses these scatter plots as the foundation of 
its analysis. 
In order to compare the transitions of white and black households across quintiles, 
transition matrices, similar to the ones used by Pew Charitable Trusts in Figure 2.1, are 
constructed from the PSID data. To display transition matrices that are representative of the 
population, sampling weights are used to create quantiles that represent equal shares of the 
population rather than equal shares of the sample. Let � represent the earnings of an individual 
and �� represent the sampling weight of that individual within a generation. The sample is sorted 
by � such that < < ⋯ < �. Let  denote the level of discretization or the number of 































quantile is { , … , }  such that ∑ ����= = �. Similarly, the set of observations in the second 
quantile is { + ,… , }  such that ∑ ����=� + = � and the pattern continues until the last 
quantile. Sample weighted transition matrices are displayed in Tables 2.2-2.4. 
 
Table 2.2: Sample Weighted Transition Matrix of the Entire Population 
  Parent's Quintile 
  n=471.3 n=470.8 n=472.0 n=471.2 n=469.5 












1 36% 27% 18% 11% 8% 
2 29% 21% 22% 17% 10% 
3 15% 25% 21% 23% 16% 
4 13% 17% 24% 26% 21% 
5 7% 11% 14% 23% 45% 
 
Table 2.3: Sample Weighted Transition Matrix of White Households 
  Parent's Quintile 
  n=196.2 n=307.6 n=399.1 n=433.1 n=462.4 












1 26% 24% 15% 10% 8% 
2 30% 17% 22% 17% 10% 
3 19% 26% 23% 23% 16% 
4 16% 19% 24% 25% 21% 
5 9% 14% 16% 25% 45% 
 
Table 2.4: Sample Weighted Transition Matrix of Black Households 
  Parent's Quintile 
  n=275.1 n=163.2 n=72.9 n=38.2 n=7.1 












1 42% 32% 34% 25% 10% 
2 29% 29% 24% 13% 55% 
3 13% 22% 15% 19% 2% 
4 10% 13% 23% 37% 0% 




The transition matrices in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 reveal large differences in prospective 
outcomes between white and black households. The probability of reaching the top quintile is 
higher for white children than black children at every level of parent’s earnings and the 
probability of settling in the bottom quintile is higher for black children than white children at 
every level of parent’s earnings. The different transition matrices display the probabilities of 
reaching any quintile from any initial quintile. Transition matrices display ample detail but, as a 
tradeoff, they do not easily summarize the differences between subgroups in a meaningful way. 
 
2.3.Bias in the Discretization of Transition Matrices 
 
2.3.1. Measuring Total Difference 
 
Drawing comparisons across subgroups through the use of transition matrices does not 
lend itself toward simple summary measurement. It is necessary to derive a simplified summary 
measure of expected differences in prospective outcomes in order to quantify and generalize the 
findings of comparative transition matrices.  
Referring to Tables 2.3 and 2.4, the expected quintile of a child can be calculated by the 
probability weighted quantile for a child within a given parent’s quantile. Let quantile  be the 
quantile of a child and  be the quantile of a parent. Let  be the level of discretization. Let ̂ �,  be the estimated transition probability of the child being in quantile  with a parent from 
quantile . 
[ ] ̂[ | ] = ∑ ̂ �,�=  
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Using Tables 2.2-2.4, we can derive an estimate of the expected quintile of children who 
have parents in each quintile. These results are displayed in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5: Sample-Weighted Expectations of Child’s Quintiles 
 Parent’s Quintile 
 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Total Sample  n=471.3 n=470.8 n=472.0 n=471.2 n=469.5 
Expected 
Quintile 
2.26 2.63 2.94 3.33 3.84 
      
White 
Households 
n=196.2 n=307.6 n=399.1 n=433.1 n=462.4 
Expected 
Quintile 
2.53 2.81 3.05 3.37 3.86 
      
Black 
Households 
n=275.1 n=163.2 n=72.9 n=38.2 n=7.1 
Expected 
Quintile 
2.07 2.28 2.39 2.85 2.88 
 
It’s clear from Table 2.5 that the expected differences in the quintile of earnings are very 
different for white children and black children. In order to summarize this phenomenon, it is 
necessary to calculate the expected difference in outcomes for white children and black children. 
Let the difference in expected child’s outcomes for a given parent’s quantile be denoted as ℎ � . [ ] ℎ � =  ̂[ | , � = �] − ̂[ | , � = ] 
Because of the PSID sample’s very different concentration of races in the extremes of the 
earnings distribution, the number of observations of white households with parents in the bottom 
quintile and the number of observations of black households with parents in the top quintile are 
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very small. This results in substantial imprecision in the estimate of expected quintile of the 
children from those subsets. The standard error of the difference in child’s outcomes in the 
presence of sampling weights is derived in Appendix 1. Let the standard error of difference be 
denoted as ℎ � . 
Differences in expected child’s outcomes along with standard errors are displayed in 
Table 2.6. 
 
Table 2.6: Expected Differences in Child Outcomes 
  Parent's Quintile 
  1 2 3 4 5 
White Households n=196.2 n=307.6 n=399.1 n=433.1 n=462.4 
Expected Quintile 2.53 2.81 3.05 3.37 3.86 
      
Black Households n=275.1 n=163.2 n=72.9 n=38.2 n=7.1 
Expected Quintile 2.07 2.28 2.39 2.85 2.88 
      
Difference in Expected 
Quintile 
0.46 0.53 0.65 0.52 0.98 
Standard Error 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.22 0.40 
 
In order to simplify differences in expected quantile across race into one summary 
measure, it is necessary to find total difference in expected quintile of children across all 
quintiles of the parent. Let ℎ � � be the expectation of ℎ �  across the spectrum of 
parent’s quantiles. Since, at high levels of discretization, there are often few observations from 
one subgroup in a given quantile, precision in that quantile is low. In order to maximize the 
information in ℎ � �, contributions from each quantile are weighted by the inverse of the 
standard error of ℎ � . 
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[ ] ℎ � � = ∑ ℎ � ℎ �=∑ ℎ �=  
 ℎ � � is a measure of the difference in expected outcomes between white children and 
black children whose parents are in the same earnings quantile. This gap in expected outcomes 
can be thought of as a summary of differences in prospective outcomes between white and black 
households across generations.  
 In the case displayed in Table 2.6, with quintiles, ℎ � � would be 0.57 quintiles 
which, measured in percentiles, is 11.35 centiles. That measure represents a remarkably large 
difference in the opportunities between white households and black households. 
 
2.3.2. Within-quantile Heterogeneity 
 
The root of bias in transition matrix estimation is the differences in the distribution of the 
subgroups within a quantile. Since quantiles are assigned for illustrative purposes rather than 
economic purposes, distributional subgroup patterns would be as pertinent within quantiles as 
between them.  
To illustrate this point, quintiles of parent’s earning are displayed along with the 
probability distribution of white and black parents. Let  represent parent’s percentile. This 
measure is different from  introduced in Section 2.3.1 in that it is continuous rather than 
discrete. The probability distribution of belonging to subgroup � is expressed as a function of  





Figure 2.4: Probability Distribution of White and Black Parents across Parent Quintiles 
 
 
The upward sloping line in Figure 2.4 is the probability distribution of white parents �|  and the downward sloping line is the probability distribution of black parents | . 
The area underneath each line represents the probability of the sample represented by each race 
across the spectrum of parent’s earnings percentile. Since the sample is only made up of white 
and black households, the probability distributions must sum to one at every point on the parent’s 
earning spectrum. The probability distribution functions of white and black, then, must be mirror 
images of each other across a horizontal axis. 
The slope is maintained within quintiles and not just between them. Since Figure 2.4 
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maintained within each quintile. To illustrate that slopes are maintained, it is worth displaying 
distributions for only one quintile. Take, for example, the second quintile, which is displayed in 
Figure 2.5, where the estimated distribution is smoothed merely within the second quintile. 
 
Figure 2.5: Probability Distribution of White and Black Parents Within the Second Quintile 
  
 
As displayed in Figure 2.5, the slopes in Figure 2.4 are maintained within the earnings 
quintiles as well as between them. The implication of this is that the distribution of earnings 
within each quintile will be very different between white and black parents. If we take the second 
quintile as an example, we know that the mean percentile should be the 30
th
 percentile within 
that distribution. Since the white distribution is sloping up within the quintile, however, it can 
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and an underrepresentation of white parents closer to the 20
th
 percentile. By the same logic, since 
the black distribution is sloping down within the quintile, it can be seen that there is an 
underrepresentation of black parents closer to the 40
th
 percentile and an overrepresentation of 
black parents closer to the 20
th
 percentile. If the mean percentile of white parents in the middle 
percentile were calculated, taking into account the higher frequency of white parents at the 
higher end of the quintile, it would be greater than 30. If the mean percentile of black parents in 
the middle percentile were calculated, taking into account the higher frequency of black parents 
at the lower end of the quintile, it would be less than 30. In fact, in the PSID data, the average 
percentile of a parent in the second quintile is 30.43 if the parent is white and 29.05 if the parent 
is black. 
The reason why transition matrices are helpful to begin with is that they are meant to 
measure differences in outcomes of individuals with the same economic status. If economic 
status is controlled for, any differences in the outcomes between subgroups are attributed to 
fundamental differences between the subgroups. The aspiration to create a counterfactual by 
controlling for economic status is a worthy one. However, it can only work correctly if economic 
status is truly constant between subgroups within a quantile. This is not the case when transition 
matrices do not account for intraquintile differences between subgroups. 
To derive an expectation of difference in the parent’s earnings percentile between races 
within a quantile, we must express the difference as a function of the non-uniform density of the 
membership of subgroup � as a function of . The density function is modeled as �| . 
Thus, since the distribution of  within quantiles is uniform with density , the joint density of 
� and  between the intervals −  and  is: 
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[ ] �, =  �|  
The marginal density of � is therefore: 
[ ] � =  ∫ �,−  
The conditional distribution of  given � is: 
[ ] |� = = �,�  
Then the expected difference in parent’s earnings percentile between races within a 
quantile can be expressed in the following way: 
[ ] [ | , �] =  ∫ |� =− = 
∫ �|−  ∫ �|−
= ∫ �|−  ∫ �|−   
Equation (7), while the most general, requires the complete probability distribution 
function �| . As an approximation and illustration, let us impose two simplifications. First, 
that �|  follows a logistic function with respect to . Second, that slopes are constant 
within a quantile. Both simplifications are imposed in order to solve the function for expected 
percentile in Equation (7).  
First suppose that �|  can be approximated with a logistic probability distribution. 




[ ] �� = � + � �+ � + � � + �� 
Table 2.7 displays the parameter estimates from Equation (8).  
 
Table 2.7: Estimates of the Parameters of a Logistic Model 
 
 
Since �� and � are inverses of each other, the coefficients from a logistic regression 
on � are simply the negative coefficients from the logistic regression on �� as shown in Table 
2.7. Let ̃ �|  be �̂ + �̂ �+ �̂ + �̂ � and let ̃ |  be −�̂ − �̂ �+ −�̂ − �̂ �. Both functional estimates are 





















� � �  � � �  �̂  0.0505 �̂  -0.8522 �   0.23 
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Figure 2.6: Logistic Probability Distributions of White and Black Parents across Parent Quintiles 
  
 
Figure 2.6 appears to be a close approximation of the nonparametric probability 
distribution in Figure 2.4. In order to integrate the component of Equation (7), we will turn now 
to imposing linear slopes within each quantile. Taking white households as the subgroup to 
illustrate this method, let ̂ �|  be a function of �|  in which the slopes are constant 
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The estimated slope of the logistic function for white households, , is calculated from 
logistic regression estimates shown in Table 7 at the midpoint of the quantile
1
. 
[ ] ̂ =  �̂ + �̂ −( + �̂ + �̂ − )  
The estimated slope for black household is simply − ̂  since all increases in the 
probability of being white must be exactly offset by a decrease in the probability of being black. 
The estimated intercept of the logistic function for white households, ̂ , is calculated 
from logistic regression estimates shown in Table 2.7 and the intra-quantile slope estimate in 
Equation (10), also from the midpoint of the quantile. 
[ ] ̂ =  �̂ + �̂ −+ �̂ + �̂ − − ̂ ( − ) 
 The estimated intercept for black households is − ̂  since any predicted 







                                                          
1
 Since logistic functions are locally either convex or concave, the midpoint of an interval will have a slope that is 
more representative of the entire interval than the slopes at either endpoint of the interval. 
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Figure 2.7, like Figure 2.6, appears to closely approximate the nonparametric probability 
distribution in Figure 2.4. By imposing the probability distribution functional form of Figure 2.7, 
we return to the estimation of expected parent’s percentile within a quantile from Equation (7).  
Equation (7) can now be predicted from a series of linear probability models within  
intervals. 
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Taking the integral, an algebraic expression can be derived for the prediction of parent’s 
expected earnings percentile for white households: 
[ ] ̂[ | , � = �] =  [ ̂ + ̂ ] −  [ ̂ + ̂ ] −
= ( ̂ + ̂ ) − ( ̂ − + ̂ − )( ̂ + ̂ ) − ( ̂ − + ̂ − )  
A similar expression can be derived for black households: [ ] ̂[ | , � = ]
=  ( ( − ̂ − ̂ ) − ( ( − ̂ − − ̂ − )( − ̂ − ̂ − ( − ̂ − − ̂ −
Using the functions in Equations (13) and (14), we can generate a predicted difference in 
the expected percentile of white parents and the expected percentile of black parents for every 
quantile. Let this difference be denoted as � . The analytical prediction of this difference 
can be expressed in the following way: [ ] �̂ =  ̂[ | , � = �] −  ̂[ | , � = ] 
In order to simplify differences in expected quantile across race into one summary 
measure, it is useful to find total difference in expected percentile of parents across all quintiles. 
Let � � be the expectation of �  across the spectrum of quantiles. Since every quantile 
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represents an equal share of the population, the prediction of � � is calculated as the simple 
mean of  �̂  across all quantiles. 
[ ] �̂ � = ∑ �̂=  
Equation (16) can be calculated using estimated parameters from the logistic model. At 
increasing levels of discretization, the functional path of  �̂ � is presented in Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8:  �̂ � as a Function of Level of Discretization 
 
 
Figure 2.8 shows that the predicted difference in parent’s percentiles within quantiles gets 
smaller as the level of discretization increases. This is intuitive since the within-quantile 













centiles of white parents and black parents is 2.63 within quartiles and 1.68 within quintiles, the 
most widely used levels of discretization. 
In order to verify that the predicted difference in parent’s percentiles, it is useful to 
generate observed values of �  and, ultimately, � �. In order to differentiate from 
expectations in Equation (7) and predicted expectations in Equations (12-14), expectations 
generated from observations are denoted with a tilde rather than a hat. Calculated �  will 
be without a hat in order to maintain consistency with ℎ �  from Section 2.3.1. [ ] � =  ̃[ | , � = �] − ̃[ | , � = ] �  is taken at each quantile of parent’s earnings. Unlike in the case of projecting 
this difference, there is imprecision in each estimate of � . Let the standard error of 
difference be denoted as � . The derivation of �  is the same as ℎ �  and can be found in Appendix 1. 
In order to derive the optimally precise measure � � from the data, contributions 
from each quantile are weighted by the inverse of the standard error of � . 
[ ] � � = ∑ � �=∑ �=  � �, given in Equation (18), is calculated for increasing levels of discretization and 













2.3.3. Total Bias from Discretization 
 
 Figure 2.9 shows that �̂ �, estimated from a logistic probability distribution, well 
characterizes the patterns of � � calculated from the PSID data. Differences in parent’s 
percentiles within quantiles is only an intermediate step, however, in estimating the bias of 
differences in child’s opportunities derived from transition matrices. Uncontrolled differences in 
parent’s earnings percentile between groups will bias the estimated difference between those 













to quantify the bias, it is first necessary to estimate the marginal effect of parent’s percentile on 
child’s predicted percentile.  
Since transition matrices capture only movements from quantiles, they are ill-equipped to 
measure marginal effects of one variable on another. A simple measure of the average marginal 
effect of parent’s earning percentile on child’s earnings percentile is the linear regression 
coefficient of parent’s percentile in a model of child’s percentile that controls for race. Since the 
additional detail of transition matrices is not necessary in estimating an average marginal effect, 
regression is the more useful and straightforward tool. The assumption of linearity was tested 
with the RESET test and was found to be suitable (Ramsey 1969). Let  be the percentile of 
earnings of a child. [ ] � = + � + �� + �� 
Regression results from Equation (19) are shown in Table 2.8. 
 





� � �  � �  �  �̂   0.32 0.03 �̂  � 10.36 1.63 �̂  �  25.98 1.29 
  0.17  
 
 
The estimated marginal effect of parent’s earnings percentile on child’s earnings 
percentile,  ̂ , as shown in Table 2.8, is 0.32. Therefore, in order to derive the predicted bias on ℎ � �, it 
is sufficient to multiply �̂ � by the marginal effect of that difference on child’s outcomes. 
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[ ] ��̂ ℎ � � = �̂ � ∗ ̂  
Figure 2.10 presents the predicted bias on the gap between child’s opportunities derived 
from transition matrices as a function of the level of discretization. 
 




To demonstrate a correction for the estimated bias, take the example of the transition 
matrix of quintiles displayed in Section 2.3.1. Equation (20) predicts that the average difference 
of a white child’s earnings percentile and a black child’s earnings percentile across all parent’s 
quintiles will be biased by 0.54 centiles. Recall from Section 2.3.1 that the estimated difference 

















and the parent’s differences within quintiles are taken into account, the unbiased estimate of 




The difference in expected outcomes between white and black households, conditional on 
parent’s economic status, is very large. The corrected estimate of 10.80 centile difference in 
annual earnings amounts to an entirely different economic status. This growing problem has not 
escaped the academics, the public, and policymakers as the attention given to it has recently 
increased dramatically. With growing attention comes growing need for precision in 
measurement since estimates reach wide audiences. 
The practice of discretization in transition matrices has simplified the comparisons of 
movements across the earnings spectrum and has made them visible. However, the simplification 
has come at the cost of accuracy. Discretization leads to a bias in the difference in prospective 
outcomes across subgroups that favors the subgroup with higher earnings parents. Similar to 
regression, the source of bias is in the omission of within-quantile variation that is correlated 
with race. The gap in prospective outcomes between white and black children has been 
overestimated by the literature from the widespread use of quintiles. Using a logistic model of 
the probability distribution functions of race, we see that this overestimate has been 
approximately 5.02%. 
Aside from the exposé of the bias that arises from discretization, this paper proposes a 
correction that can be used to derive unbiased estimates of differences in prospective outcomes. 
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Future researchers should exercise caution when using discretized variables and make sure that 
the proposed corrections are made. 
In a world where panel income data is getting more available and public priorities are 
shifting toward the egalitarianism of opportunity, comparisons of the prospective outcomes 
between subgroups will be drawn more and more. It will become increasingly important to make 
sure that future estimates be free of bias in order to have the most appropriate and measured 
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2.5. Appendix: Derivation of the Sample-Weighted Standard Error of a Quantile Mean 
 
The variance of mean child’s quantile, , within a parent’s quantile : 
[ ] [ ̅ − � ] =  [ ∑ ����= +� − ∑ ��
�
�= +� − � − � ]
=  [  
 ∑ ����= +� − ∑ ��
�
�= +� − � − � ) ]  
 
=  ∑ ����= +� − [  
 ∑ ����= +� − � − � ) ]  
 
 
Since observations are independent of each other, the expected value of the cross products in the 
summation ∑ ����= +� − � − �  are  and the population variance can be written as: 
[ ] ∑ ����= +� − ∑ ��
�
�= +� − �  
The estimated standard error of of ̅ , then, is: 
[ ] ̅ = ∑ ����= +� −∑ ����= +� −  
The standard error of the difference between two means takes the following form: 








3 The Ups and Downs of Consumption Mobility:  



























The dynamics of consumption is of considerable interest but has gotten limited exposure in 
recent research due to a lack of household-level panel data. This paper pools the panel datasets 
that are available through The World Bank Living Standard Measurement Surveys in order to get 
robust measures of the annual mobility of household per-capita consumption. Through a 
differentiation of mobility between its downward component, vulnerability, and its upward 
component, adaptability, asymmetries are explored in the contributions of education and 














Among the many important interests that households have about their livelihood, one 
important dimension concerns the prospects of changes in their living standards. A large body of 
literature addresses the determinants and mechanics of poverty, a static concept. Much less, 
unfortunately, exists to address the dynamic counterpart to poverty which is mobility (Fields & 
Efe 1999). This could partly be due to confusion about what, exactly, mobility is. Its 
measurements, properties, and determinants are not immediately obvious. 
Mobility can take on two forms: an upward movement in a household’s standard of living 
over time or a downward movement in a household’s standard of living over time. The 
distinction between the two is important because there are different reasons for each. 
The literature on upward and downward intragenerational mobility encompasses many 
papers since the early 1990s that are largely concerned with the change in living standards 
associated with a macroeconomic downturn. Subsequent to this emphasis on vulnerability, there 
has been a small body of literature developed that emphasizes responsiveness to macroeconomic 
upturns, calling it adaptability (Glewwe et al. 2000). These approaches seek to measure 
characteristics that correspond to changes in living standards and attribute those changes to how 
certain households adapt to (or are vulnerable to) those macroeconomic changes (Ligon & 
Schechter 2003). 
The approaches used previously are insufficient in studying the determinants of mobility. 
One reason is that it taken as implicit that changes in living standards are a response to 
macroeconomic conditions. This argument is reflected in the justification for using a specific 
country as a case study of an underlying reality that has broad applicability. This is insufficient 
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because even during severe economic downturns there are many households whose standard of 
living rises, and during strong economic upturns there are many households whose standard of 
living decreases. It is implausible to think that those households who succeed during recessions 
do so because of it rather than in spite of it. The same could be said for those who experience 
personal downturns during expansions. A more intuitively sufficient way to think about mobility 
is that each household faces its own economic conditions, some of which may well be 
independent to broader macroeconomic conditions. 
Another reason for previous approaches being insufficient is their failure to capture the 
dual nature of mobility. Some households may be able to adapt better to economic opportunities. 
Households may also be able to protect themselves from economic challenges. Because 
exploiting opportunities is not the same thing as protecting oneself from economic challenges, 
these households may have different characteristics from each other. There are different causal 
mechanisms associated with each action and it would be a mistake to equate the two because it 
would not sufficiently explain the forces that drive the variation in mobility. 
This paper outlines and implements an approach that could be used in assessing the 
determinants of intragenerational mobility. It makes use of pooled panel datasets in order to 
increase precision and to ensure that results are generalizable beyond individual countries and 




The dataset used in this study is a pooled dataset using four panel datasets of the World 
Bank Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS). The standard of living of households is 
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calculated by the annual per capita consumption of a household. This has benefits above using 
measures of income since it gives a more realistic depiction of how a household lives. Utility is 
derived, not from income, but rather, from what that income can buy. In a sense, income 
measures are used so frequently as a measure of standard of living only because they are a 
simple proxy for consumption that is not measured in most household-level surveys. This is one 
advantage of the LSMS datasets: consumption is measured in great detail. 
The LSMS is not always nationally representative due to the high costs of making it so. 
Sampling weights are provided in each survey wave to make appropriate adjustments in order to 
draw conclusions for the population. After the proper adjustments are made, percentiles in the 
data reflect population percentiles. 
The dataset contains data from four countries is shown in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: LSMS Data 






2001 2004 2820 
Cote D’Ivoire 1985 1986 754 
Cote D’Ivoire 1986 1987 772 
Cote D’Ivoire 1987 1988 775 
Peru 1985 1990 920 
Tajikistan 2007 2009 1356 
 
The use of data from multiple countries is crucial in achieving robustness. However, it 
does present some challenges. 
The most challenging aspect of using multiple datasets is that the number of years 
between the waves of a survey is not constant. Mobility clearly increases over time and it is not 
immediately clear exactly how much of the additional mobility in the countries surveyed over a 
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longer time can be attributed to the longer time span. There are additional challenges imposed by 
the existence of confounding variables that also contribute to mobility. The most obvious 
example is that of inflation rates beyond expectations. An inflation rate beyond market 
expectations serves to redistribute wealth from all households with positive net savings to 
households with negative net savings through downward pressure on real interest rates. This was 
exactly the case for Peru in the years when the survey was taken. From 1985 to 1990, the 
consumer price index in Peru increased by 233,170%. This generates enormous mobility as 
wealth becomes redistributed from savers to borrowers. Peru also happens to be the country with 
the longest time in between surveys so it is difficult to know how much of the additional 
mobility in Peru is due to hyperinflation or to the passage of time. 
The existence of multiple countries in the dataset causes further complication because 
each of these countries has a different education system which makes it difficult to make cross-
country comparisons. Levels of education were converted into total years of completed education 
in an attempt to make the figures of education comparable. 
Although these challenges are nontrivial and should be taken seriously, the use of 
multiple panel datasets is necessary in order to arrive at externally valid results. In fact, any 
differences in the estimates between countries serve as critiques to the external validity of studies 
that use one country as a pilot study. Any differences in results by country would expose factors 
that cannot be generalized. By allowing country-specific differences to be absorbed in the error 
term, the mobility left in the empirical model should represent “market-induced” or “robust” 





3.3. Measuring Mobility 
 
Mobility, in this paper, is measured as a household’s change in percentile of 
consumption. Ideally, mobility should reflect the portion of changes in utility that is not due to 
initial levels of consumption (Ligon & Schechter 2004). There is some debate about whether 
mobility should be measured by percent changes in consumption or as a ranking. Absolute 
change in consumption has its merits as a proxy of utility that is more informative than a strictly 
relative measure. Changes in consumption, however, do not sufficiently isolate the phenomenon 
of mobility from the broader economic environment. The common expression, “a rising tide lifts 
all boats” attributed to former President John F. Kennedy (1964), touches upon the idea that 
economic activity may affect all households at once. If the consumption of households were to 
rise evenly across the entire consumption distribution, measures of consumption changes would 
not reflect relative mobility at all since the economic standing of each household would stay the 
same. Bengali & Daly (2013) draw a similar analogy by likening the consumption spectrum to an 
escalator – an escalator can affect the altitude of every person all at once but, unless some people 
are moving ahead or behind others, it cannot affect the altitude of one person relative to another. 
In order to isolate the relative nature of mobility, it is most appropriate to use the 
rankings of households within their consumption distribution. That is, if all households were 
ranked in order of consumption in a beginning year, the change in their ranking from one year to 
the next year is what concerns us. Even if consumption increases or decreases for all households, 
mobility can still be accurately measured as the performance of one household relative to the 
other households. The use of rankings is especially suitable for this study, which aims to isolate 
vulnerability and adaptability, both of which are relative measures within a distribution. This 
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method is the same method used in the measurement of mobility across generations (Solon 
1992). An additional benefit to using percentile rankings is that coefficients can be easily 
interpreted as correlation coefficients
1
. Further support for this approach to mobility comes from 
the field of behavioral finance which states that the change in the utility of a household has much 
to do with comparison of that household’s peers (Kahneman et al. 1991). 
 
3.4. Mobility in the data 
 
After ranking consumption into percentiles it becomes easy to visualize exactly what was 
happening to the relative consumption of each household over time. Let �  represent the 
percentile of consumption in the first survey year. Let �  represent the percentile of 









                                                          
1
 Let percentile in the first time period be �  and percentile in the second time period be � . �  and � , by construction, have a uniform distribution with a constant variance. Therefore, � =  � . In a regression of � =  +  � +  � , we estimate ̂� =  � ,��  and therefore ̂� =  � ,�� �� =  � ,� . 
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Figure 3.1: Mobility by Country: Household Consumption Percentiles across Two Waves 
Bosnia & Herzegovina (∆ waves = 3 years) Cote D’Ivoire (∆ waves = 1 year) 
  
 
Peru (∆ waves = 5 years)  Tajikistan (∆ waves = 2 years) 
  
 
The mobility displayed by the above scatterplots is quite staggering. Every point 
(household) begins on the 45-degree line and, over time, drifts away from that. The amount of 
movement, especially in Peru and Tajikistan, shows surprisingly little correlation between 







































































Figure 3.2: Mobility by Country: Density Distributions of Household Percentile Change  
Bosnia & Herzegovina (∆ waves = 3 years) Cote D’Ivoire (∆ waves = 1 year) 
  
 
Peru (∆ waves = 5 years)  Tajikistan (∆ waves = 2 years) 
  
 
Unsurprisingly, Cote D’Ivoire has the least mobility because the four surveys taken in 
that country were all one year apart. Peru has the most mobility, which is likely due to the time 
between surveys. 
The unimodality in the distributions in Figure 3.2 is due to the construction of percentiles. 
Since percentiles are uniformly distributed, independence between percentiles would imply a 
triangular distribution of the change in percentile. The difference between a triangular 
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In order to provide a full sense of the patterns of mobility in the surveyed countries, 
several measures of mobility are introduced and presented.  
(i) The average absolute change in the percentile of consumption can be called � ℎ . 
[ ] � ℎ = ∑ |� − � |=  
(ii) The standard deviation of change in the percentile of consumption can be referred 
to as � ℎ .  [ ] � ℎ =  �� −�  
(iii) One way of measuring the sensitivity of current consumption to consumption in 
the previous time period, is through a measure of elasticity. In order to calculate 
an elasticity, it is necessary to convert consumption in each period to the natural 
log. Let  represent the natural log of consumption in the first time period. Let 
 represent the natural log of consumption in the second time period.  [ ] � � � =  � � , � � �� �  
(iv) The preferred method for calculating mobility is the correlation between �  and � . Since �  and �  are percentiles, this correlation measure is a Spearman’s 







Table 3.2: Mobility by Country 




Peru Tajikistan All ��  � ��  �� 3 1 5 2 2.44  
(weighted 
average) � � � 24.28 15.62 27.58 26.17 22.34 � 31.53 21.37 34.85 33.24 29.57 � 0.38 0.72 0.28 0.38 0.47 �  0.39 0.71 0.27 0.34 0.56 
 
All of the measures of mobility shown in Table 3.2 are useful. The preferred measure of 
this paper (for reasons given in Section 3.3) is the correlation between percentile of consumption 
in one survey and percentile of consumption in the next. 
This measure of correlation also allows us to derive a measure of mobility that is 
standardized for the passage of time. The correlation between the first wave of survey and the 
next, �, does not account for differences in the time passed between surveys. We can define  
as the correlation between percentile of consumption in the first time period and percentile of 
consumption one year later. That way, the observed correlation is only  compounded by the 
number of years. This can be explained as follows: Let  be the time between surveys. The 
simple model, ignoring the number of years that elapsed between survey rounds is: [ ] � , + =  +  �� , + , +  
The model that compounds the effect of time is presented below: 2 [See Appendix 1 for 
derivation] 
                                                          
2
 � , +  is a heteroskedastic disturbance term such that � (��, + ) = �  and � = � ( , + ) 
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[ ] � , + =  ∑= +  � , +  � , +  
 
Table 3.3: Simple Correlations, �, versus Time Compounded Correlations,  




Peru Tajikistan All ��  � ��  ��  3 1 5 2 2.44  
(weighted 
average) � 0.39 0.71 0.27 0.34 0.56 
 0.73 0.71 0.77 0.58 0.70 
 
As shown by Table 3.3, much of the variation in mobility disappears with the 
introduction of time-compounding measure of correlations. The measures can be interpreted as 
the correlation between percentile of consumption in one year and percentile of consumption in 
the next year. The estimate of 0.7 shown under the last column in Table 3.2 is the most robust 
measure of this correlation. If there were  years between surveys, the best estimate of 
correlation of the percentile ranks over that time span would be 0.7
 
to the ℎ power. 
 
3.5. Household Size and Education 
 
In previous papers on adaptability and vulnerability, there were only two major variables 
that were consistently significant in determining changes in consumption over time (Christiansen 
& Subbarao 2005, Cunningham & Maloney 2000, Glewwe & Hall 1998, Haughton et al. 1992, 
Woolard & Klasen 2005). Those variables are household size and education. 
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Household size may be justified as a limiting factor that lessens the ability to adapt in 
times of economic growth since family burdens can act as a disincentive toward risk-taking. It 
may also increase vulnerability during times of economic hardship if large households cannot 
easily switch income activities toward sectors or locations that have been less hard hit by the 
downturn. 
Education may be justified as contributing to adaptability in the sense that more educated 
households have an advantage in adopting new technology. It may also limit vulnerability 
through representing a more diverse skill set that can be tapped into in the case of a loss in 
economic opportunities (Schultz 1975). 
The effect of education is difficult to estimate in the context of multiple countries. 
Theoretically, the return to education is partially due to increases in human capital. Human 
capital theory would be more consistent with stable increases in consumption for each year of 
education in any given country. It tells us that marginal product of labor increases with a year of 
education because of the skills that a year of education provides to a laborer. The return to 
education is also partially due to the strength of education as a signal of relative ability. 
Signaling theory would be more consistent with stable increases in consumption across countries 
for each increase of education relative to the average education within that country (Ehrenberg 
& Smith 2008). It credits the returns to education to a signal of being more skilled than peers. 
These increases in education are more valuable if the general public is less educated and less 
valuable when the general public is more educated. 
As it happens, the countries in the dataset do have substantially different educational 
characteristics. As seen in Table 3.4, below, heads of households in Cote D’Ivoire generally have 
much less education than heads of households in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Peru, or Tajikistan. 
93 
 
Table 3.4: Education Characteristics across Countries 
 Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Cote D’Ivoire Peru Tajikistan 
Average Years  10.81 2.95 9.74 11.01 
Standard 
Deviation 
4.24 5.90 3.80 3.61 
 
To test the differences in educational effects, two models are run. This is done initially 
without differentiating between upward and downward mobility to motivate the different 
measurements of education. 
The first is a model to measure changes in percentile of consumption as a function of 
years of education and household size. The nonlinear form described in Section 3.4 is used in all 
specifications to maintain generality across differing years between survey waves. Let  be years 
of education. Let � be household size, both assumed to be time invariant over the time span 
between survey waves. [See Appendix 2 for motivation.] 
[ ] � , + =  ∑= +  � , +  ∑= +  ∑= � +  � , +  
The competing theories on education provide a good reason to construct an education 
variable for a household as the years of education divided by the average number of years of 
education within that country. That is to say, that education would be measured as the percent of 
average education. For example, a head of household with 6 years of education would have 
about 50% of the average in Tajikistan but about 200% of the average in Cote D’Ivoire. This 




Therefore, the second model measures changes in percentile of consumption as a function 
of years of education relative to average education and household size. Let  represent the years 
of education as a ratio of the average education of that country. 
[ ] =  ̅� � 
Then, the second model is written using nonlinear least squares as follows: 
[ ] � , + =  ∑= +  � , +  ∑= + ∑= � +  � , +  
 








 �  Model 2  �   




  0.15 
(0.04) 
 
   1.99 
(0.19) 








Observations  7397 7397 
  0.709 0.712 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses 
  
In turning to the results in Table 3.5, it is clear that in both Model 1 and Model 2, the 
signs are as expected and all coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. It seems that 
Model 2 is slightly better, which implies that education is more usefully measured when it is 
compared with local peers, lending support for the signaling theory of education. 
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Theory is confirmed that being educated has a positive effect on changes in levels of 
consumption, either by increasing the ability to guard against vulnerabilities or by increasing 
adaptability. What the source of this is will be addressed in the following section. 
Household size has a negative effect on mobility which confirms the theory that the 
number of dependents in a household limits the household’s flexibility and adaptability. 
The correlation between percentile rank in one period and percentile rank in the next of 
0.66 is quite small and implies substantial mobility over time. To illustrate what a correlation of 
0.66 means to households, consider two households – one is presently in the 10th percentile of 
consumption and the other in the 90
th
 percentile. After some time, regression to the mean would 
cause these households to have more similar expected levels of consumption. After only five 
years the expected difference in the consumption percentiles of these two households would be 
ten centiles, a big decline from the initial 80 centile difference. 
 
3.6. Vulnerability and Adaptability 
 
Let vulnerability be defined as downward mobility and adaptability be defined as upward 
mobility. The reason for creating the distinction is that the two arise from different fundamental 
reasons. 
Downward mobility arises from households being unable to protect themselves relative to 
their peers. If a household is faced with a negative economic situation, a household that is 
vulnerable is not able to mitigate the losses from that situation; a household that is not vulnerable 
is able to mitigate those losses. 
96 
 
Upward mobility arises from a household’s ability to take advantage of good 
opportunities. A household that is adaptable is able to make the most of economic opportunity; a 
household that is not adaptable is able to make that situation turn into as much consumption. 
The different causes of downward mobility and upward mobility sufficient justification 
for creating and applying models that recognize the distinction. The models in Section 3.5 
implicitly assumes that the mechanisms of vulnerability and adaptability have equal and opposite 
effects on consumption. This assumption should be relaxed by measuring the effects of a 
determinant on vulnerability separately from the effects of that same determinant on adaptability. 
In order to allow for this flexibility, a variable for positive or negative consumption changes 
must be fully interacted into the initial model.  
 =  {  �  �  � �  �   
  varies substantially across survey panels, as shown in Table 3.6. The disparities can be 
attributed to differing macroeconomic environments. 
 




















55.11% 47.48% 49.35% 39.61% 48.59% 64.68% 53.05% 
 
 cannot simply be used as term to be interacted with  and � since, by construction, is 
highly correlated with changes in percentile of consumption. To control for this, the residual is 











Linear Probability Model 
 
 
 �  0.014 
(.0002) 
 �  -0.013 
(.0002) 
  0.495 
(.01) 
Observations  7397 
  0.52 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses 
 
The residual, , can then by interpreted as the non-relative portion of consumption 
increasing or decreasing over time. By construction, it is orthogonal to percentile rank and, 
therefore, only enters the equation for percentile rank through its interaction with covariates. It 
can be attributed to all macroeconomic variables that affect the population as a whole and can be 
thought of a as the general as the macroeconomic effect on consumption. Figure 3.3 shows the 












Figure 3.3: Density Distributions of  across all Panels 
Cote D’Ivoire 
1985 – 1986 
Cote D’Ivoire 
1986 – 1987 
Cote D’Ivoire 
1987 – 1988 
   
Bosnia & Herzegovina 
2001 – 2004 
Peru 
1985 – 1990 
Tajikistan 
2007 – 2009 
   
 
The bimodal distributions of  shown in Figure 3.3 are due to  being the residual from 
a linear probability model. Since the dependent variable, , is either 0 or 1, deviation from an 
expectation will be clustered around negative values when  is 0 and clustered around positive 
values when  is 1. The value of  at the negative cluster will be representative of the general 
macroeconomic effect on consumption for households whose consumption decreased. The value 
of  at the positive cluster will be representative of the general macroeconomic effect on 
consumption for households whose consumption increased. The distribution of  for the entire 
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Figure 3.4: Density Distributions of  for Entire Sample 
 
 
The distribution of  in the entire sample has two peaks – one at -0.41, the other at 0.38. 
The left mode of the distribution represents households whose consumption decreased based on 
factors that are unrelated to relative consumption. Therefore, a household having an  value of -
0.41 could be said to be subject to economic downturns in a way that is typical of the rest of the 
sample. The right mode of the distribution represents households whose consumption increased 
based on factors that are unrelated to relative consumption. Therefore, a household having an  
value of 0.38 could be said to be subject to economic opportunity in a way that is typical of the 
rest of the sample. 
[ ] � , + =  ∑= +  � , +  ∑= +  ∑= � +  ∑= , +
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 �  
 �  0.65 
(.01) 
  2.03 
(0.19) 
 � -0.44 
(0.07) 
  -11.14 
(1.95) 
 � ∗  0.13 
(0.03) 
 ∗  -0.12 
(0.40) 
 � ∗  0.77 
(0.17) 
 Constant 17.16     
(0.78) 
Observations  7397 
  0.72 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses 
 
 In order to interpret the results from Table 3.8 in the context of vulnerability and 
adaptability, it is useful to consider the modal values of  that represent households that are 
typically vulnerable and adaptable. A household having a value of  of -0.39 is a representative 
vulnerable household. By plugging -0.39 into Equation 11 for , we can derive a regression that 
represents a typical vulnerable household. A household having a value of  of 0.42 is a 
representative adaptable household. By plugging 0.42 into Equation 11 for , we can derive a 
regression that represents a typical adaptable household. Table 3.9 displays the regression results 









 �  Adaptability  �  �  0.60 0.71 





The results shown in Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 reveal some interesting truths about the 
nature of mobility. The richest evidence in the model is the high degree of significance of the 
interaction terms in Table 3.8. This is supportive of the notion that vulnerability and adaptability 
are indeed different phenomena. It demonstrates that a failure to separate upward mobility from 
downward mobility will yield biased estimates of the impact on mobility. These results should 
emphasize the notion that future modeling done on intragenerational mobility should allow for 
flexibility in separating vulnerability from adaptability. 
Perhaps the most notable result is the difference in the parameter on initial percentile of 
consumption. In the context of decreases in consumption, there is a correlation coefficient of 
percentile of consumption in one year and percentile of consumption in the next of 0.60. In the 
context of increases in consumption, there is a correlation coefficient of percentile of 
consumption in one year and percentile of consumption in the next of 0.71. This is a huge 
difference, especially considering that this is an annual figure and gets compounded every year. 
Referring to the example is Section 3.5 concerning the two households whose consumption 




 percentiles. After five years of a negative economic 
environment, when the correlation of consumption is 0.60 per year, these households would have 
an expected difference of 6 centiles. After five years of a positive economic environment, when 
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the correlation of consumption is 0.71 per year, these households would have an expected 
difference of 15 centiles. 
It was first assumed in Glewwe & Hall (1998) and repeated in later papers (Cunningham 
& Maloney 2000, Van Kerm 2004) that economic downturns are responsible for a larger-than-
usual disturbance of consumption percentiles. This supposition has been without formal 
verification and is now shown to be true by the larger correlation in consumption percentiles in 
the context of economic upturns. 
Theoretically, there is good justification for believing that education can both help 
households protect themselves from hard times and help households take advantage of 
opportunity. Both of these are confirmed at the 1% significance level. More interestingly, the 
magnitude of the effects is similar but not quite the same. The effect of an increase in education 
(relative to the local average education level) is a decrease in vulnerability by 2.07 percentile 
places. The effect of that same increase in education is an increase in adaptability by 1.98 
percentile places. That tells us that education is useful in helping households get richer, and 
slightly more useful in helping household become less poor. This result not only tells us 
something interesting about mobility but, additionally, adds to our understanding of education in 
general. 
The effect of household size is completely asymmetric. Of the total effect that household 
size has on mobility, all of it is from increased vulnerability while none of it reflects a lack of 
ability to adapt. While households with many dependents have limited flexibility to be swift in 
making the most of a negative shock, there is possibly less quickness required during expansions 
since they are usually more predictable. Another explanation could be that larger households 
have more members available to step into new opportunities when they arise which may set off 
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the inflexibility component. The interpretation of this evidence is that large households are 





 The quality of data compiled for this analysis is crucial in the ability of the assertions of 
this paper to be conclusive. The practice of pooling datasets is recommended because if there are 
issues of incomparability between countries, they will be more evident upon exploration of the 
data. This forces researchers to specify variables in ways that maximize the external validity of 
the results. 
 The issues of vulnerability and adaptability are not just interesting to researchers but also 
have extensive policy implications. Policy that targets poverty is not redrafted every year. 
Therefore, when targeting poverty, policymakers should be concerned about the dynamics of 
households and whether some are more likely than others to fall into poverty in the future. Even 
being aware that poverty is stochastic should be useful in drafting policy that is not too myopic 
to be socially useful. The results in this study could prove useful in creating policy related to 
education, family planning, and retirement since the new parameters involving the education and 
size of households add to the understanding of how those characteristics affect future standards 
of living. 
 From an applied research perspective, the case should be reaffirmed that it is critical to 
model vulnerability and adaptability as phenomena that are distinct from each other. The sources 
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and magnitudes of variation in vulnerability are not the same as the sources and magnitudes of 
variation in adaptability. 
 A particularly interesting result is the asymmetry of general mobility during different 
economic contexts. There is considerable more mobility during bad economic environments than 
there are in good economic environments. 
 Education is shown to have an equally large effect on mitigating vulnerability and 
encouraging adaptability. This reinforces education as an important determinant of mobility 
irrespective of economic context. 
 Household size is shown to have no statistically significant effect on adaptability. 
Household size does, however, have a large effect on vulnerability. Larger households, as 
evidenced by the data, adapt in line with the rest of the economy to positive economic 
opportunities. They are particularly sensitive to negative economic conditions. 
 There is much to be done in terms of future research. The techniques outlined in this 
paper could be used, extended, and retested on more countries, longer panels, and different units 
of observation. More investigation could be done into the characteristics of household attrition 
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3.8.1. Appendix 1: Derivation of the nonlinear least squares method introduced in 
Section 3.4 
 [ ] � ,�+ =  � + � � ,� +  � ,�+  
Moving up one period: [ ] � ,�+ =  � +  � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
Substituting in Equation 1: [ ] � ,�+ =  � +  � � +  � � ,� +  � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
Rearranging to isolate terms: [ ] � ,�+ =  � + � +  � � ,� + � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
Moving up one period: [ ] � ,�+ =  � + � + � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
Substituting in Equation 1: [ ] � ,�+ =  � + � +  � � +  � � ,� +  � ,�+ + � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
Rearranging:  [ ] � ,�+ =  � + � + � +  � � ,� + � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
Moving up one period: [ ] � ,�+ =  � + � + � +  � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
Substituting in Equation 1: [ ] � ,�+ =  � + � + � + � � +  � � ,� +  � ,�+ + � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
Rearranging: [ ] � ,�+ =  � + � + � + � +  � � ,� +  � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
Moving up one period: 
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[ ] � ,�+ =  � + � + � + � +  � � ,�+ +  � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
Substituting in Equation 1: [ ] � ,�+ =  � + � + � + � +  � � +  � � ,� +  � ,�+ +  � � ,�++ � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
Rearranging: [ ] � ,�+ =  � + � + � + � + � +  � � ,� +  � � ,�+ + � � ,�++ � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
Let � represent the number of years between panels. And let the last term in Equation 13 be 
denoted by � ,�+ . 















3.8.2. Appendix 2: To be used as an example to motivate all further models with any 
number of covariates, as in Section 3.5 
 [ ]� ,�+ =  � + � � ,� + � � + � � +  � ,�+  
Moving up one period: [ ]� ,�+ =  � + � � ,�+ + � � + � � +  � ,�+  
Substituting in Equation 1: [ ]� ,�+ =  � + � � + � � ,� + � � + � � +  � ,�+ + � � + � � +  � ,�+  
Rearranging to isolate terms: [ ]� ,�+ =  � + � + � � ,� + � + � � + � + � � + � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
 
Moving up one period: [ ]� ,�+ =  � + � + � � ,�+ + � + � � + � + � � + � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
Substituting in Equation 1: [ ]� ,�+ =  � + � + � � + � � ,� + � � + � � + � ,�+ + � + � � + �+ � � + � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
Rearranging: [ ]� ,�+ =  � + � + � + � � ,� + � + � + � � + � + � + � � + � � ,�++  � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
 
Moving up one period: [ ]� ,�+ =  � + � + � + � � ,�+ + � + � + � � + � + � + � �+ � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
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Substituting in Equation 1: [ ]� ,�+ =  � + � + � + � � + � � ,� + � � + � � +  � ,�+ + � + � + � �+ � + � + � � + � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
Rearranging: [ ]� ,�+ =  � + � + � + � + � � ,� + � + � + � + � � + � + � + �+ � � + � � ,�+ +  � � ,�+ +  � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
 
Moving up one period: [ ]� ,�+ =  � + � + � + � + � � ,�+ + � + � + � + � � + � + � + �+ � � + � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ +  � � ,�+ + � ,�+  
Substituting in Equation 1: [ ]� ,�+ =  � + � + � + � + � � + � � ,� + � � + � � +  � ,�+ + � + �+ � + � � + � + � + � + � � + � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ +  � � ,�++ � ,�+  
Rearranging: [ ]� ,�+ =  � + � + � + � + � + � � ,�+ + � + � + � + � + � � + �+ � + � + � + � � + � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ + � � ,�+ +  � � ,�+ +  � ,�+  
Let � represent the number of years between panels. And let the last term in Equation 13 be 
denoted by � ,�+ . 





3.8.3. Appendix 3: Robustness Checks for Models in Section 3.5 
 
Below is Model 1 in Section 3.5, displayed in Equation 7 of the text: 
� ,�+ =  � ∑ �= + � � ,� +  � ∑ �= � +  � ∑ �= � +  � ,�+  
The table below presents Model 1 in its original form in the first column, then with country and 
wave dummy variables used as controls, and run separately by country. 
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  No Yes No - - - - 
Wave 
Dummies 
  No No Yes - - - - 
 Observations  7397 7397 7397 2820 2301 920 1356 
 �   0.709 0.716 0.717 0.160 0.520 0.281 0.141 










Below is Model 2 in Section 3.5, displayed in Equation 9 of the text: 
� ,�+ =  � ∑ �= +  � � ,� +  � ∑ �= � +  � ∑ �= � + � ,�+  
The table below presents Model 2 in its original form in the first column, then with country and 
wave dummy variables used as controls, and, run separately by country. 
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  No Yes No - - - - 
Wave 
Dummies 
  No No Yes - - - - 
 Observations  7397 7397 7397 2820 2301 920 1356 
 �   0.709 0.716 0.717 0.160 0.520 0.281 0.140 












3.8.4. Appendix 4: Robustness Checks for Model in Section 3.6 
 
Below is the model in Section 3.6, displayed in Equation 11 of the text: 
� ,�+ =  � ∑ �= +  � � ,� +  � ∑ �= �� +  � ∑ �= � +  � ∑ �= � ,�+
+  � ∑ �= � ,�� ,�+ + � ∑ �= � � ,�+ +  � ∑ �= � � ,�+ + � ,�+  
The table below presents the model above in its original form in the first column, then with 
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  No Yes No - - - - 
Wave 
Dummies 
  No No Yes - - - - 
 Observations  7397 7397 7397 2820 2301 920 1356 
 �   0.72 0.72 0.72 0.17 0.53 0.30 0.21 
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